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I.

A.

BANKRUPTCY & CREDITORS' RIGHTS

Mack Financial Corp. v. Ireson Best Repair Co. v. United
States: Postpetition Late Charges and Interest Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ("1898 Act")' provided that creditors could
recover interest and charges that related to outstanding claims owed to
creditors by debtors proceeding under the 1898 Act, to the extent that such
interest and charges accrued prior to the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy
petition.2 Under the 1898 Act, however, courts characterized interest and
charges which accrued on debts that remained outstanding after a debtor
filed a petition for relief (collectively referred to as "Postpetition Charges",
individually referred to as "postpetition interest" and "postpetition late
charges") as penalties. 3 Because courts considered penalties incompatible
with the policies of the 1898 Act, which were to ease the administration of
an estate in bankruptcy and to protect the claims of junior and unsecured4
creditors, courts did not permit creditors to enforce Postpetition Charges,

1. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978),
2. See id. § 63(a) (allowing creditor to recover interest and charges that accrued prior
to debtor's filing of bankruptcy petition); see also Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358,
359 (1964) (allowing creditor to recover prepetition interest on debtor's outstanding debt under
§ 63 of Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ("1898 Act")); Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911)
(recognizing that § 63 of 1898 Act entitles creditor to recover on outstanding debt interest that
accrues before debtor files bankruptcy petition),
3. See e.g., New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 330 (1948) (interest that accrues after
debtor files petition for relief (postpetition interest) on tax claim constitutes penalty under
1898 Act); In re Hawks, 471 F.2d 305, 308 (4th Cir, 1973) (holding that late charge that
accrues after debtor files petition for relief (postpetition late charge) constitutes penalty under
1898 Act); United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719, 720 (4th Cir. 1959) (postpetition late
charge constitutes penalty under 1898 Act); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, chapter 541, 30 Stat. 544
(1898) (repealed 1978). Under the 1898 Act, courts allowed parties to contract for liquidated
damages, but not charges that increased debtors' payments after default for faling to pay an
outstanding debt. See In re Tastyeast, 126 F.2d 879, 881-82 (3d Cir. 1942) (postpetition interest
on outstanding debt for debtor's default on note constitutes penalty under 1898 Act). Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978). Courts characterized
postpetition interest and postpetition late charges (collectively referred to as "Postpetition
Charges") as penalties under the 1898 Act because the inequality in bargaining power between
debtors and creditors forces debtors to risk increased payments to creditors upon default due
to debtors' economic needs. In re Tastyeast, 126 F.2d 879, 882 (3d Cir. 1942).
4. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978); see Vanston
Bankholders Protective Comm. v. Greene, 329 US. 156, 164 (1946) (postpetition late charges
are inconsistent with policies of 1898 Act). Bankruptcy courts cited two reasons for denying
Postpetition Charges under the 1898 Act. Id. at 164, 166, First, allowing Postpetition Charges
required courts continually to recompute creditor claims that may have accrued while the debt
was outstanding and, therefore, complicated the administration of bankruptcy estates. Id. at
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Although the 1898 Act limited a creditor's ability to collect Postpetition

Charges, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "Code") 5 expanded
creditors' rights to collect claims against debtors in bankruptcy by entitling
6
creditors to collect Postpetition Charges in certain situations.
7
Under the Code, when a debtor files a petition for relief, creditors may
file proofs of claims against the debtor's estate for the amount of outstanding obligations that the debtor owes the creditors. 8 Section 502(b)(2) of the

164. Bankruptcy courts recognized, however, that denying Postpetition Charges on the outstanding debt eases administration of a bankruptcy estate because the Postpetition Charges on
the outstanding debt cease to accrue as of the date of the bankruptcy petition. Id. Second, as
courts of equity, bankruptcy courts did not want creditors to profit by delay in the administration of an estate to the detriment of subordinate creditors. Id. at 166. Creditors with priority
could collect a greater proportion of the bankrupt estate because a delay in administration of
an estate increases the amount of Postpetition Charges that priority creditors may collect from
the estate while reducing the size of the estate from which subordinate creditors may collect
subordinate claims. Id. Additionally, creditors collecting interest for a debtor at a rate higher
than the prevailing market rate profit because of the delay in the administration of the estate.
Id.
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) BB amended by Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333; see Report
of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d
Cong., lt Sess. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Commission Report], reprinted in 2 app., L. Kn.G,
COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY

1, 1 (15th ed. 1985). In 1970 Congress appointed a commission to

study existing bankruptcy laws and suggest reforms in the 1898 Act. Id.; see Act of July 24,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (creating commission to study existing bankruptcy
law); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). The commission noted that the
use of debt to finance consumer purchases and business ventures increased dramatically from
1948 to 1970. Commission Report, supra, at 33. For example, the number of bankruptcies
involving individual consumers increased from 8566 in 1946 to 191,729 in 1967 while the
amount of outstanding debt for individual consumers increased from $31 billion to $338 billion
over the same period. Id. Additionally, the number of business bankruptcies increased from
1630 in 1946 to 18,132 in 1972, while the average liability per business failure increased from
$44,690 in 1948 to $175,638 in 1970 ($131,729 in 1948 dollars). Id. at 33-35. In its report the
commission stated that the primary goal of the bankruptcy system was to rehabilitate the
finances of debtors so that debtors again may contribute economically to society Id. The
commission further stated that a secondary goal of the bankruptcy system was to provide
equitable treatment to both debtors and creditors in a credit-based economy. Id. The commission's findings evidenced greater sophistication in debtor-creditor relationships. Id. Given
the commission's findings, Congress determined a need to modernize bankruptcy law to deal
with debtor-creditor relationships and to maintain the equitable policies of bankruptcy law.
Id. Consequently, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101151326; see H.R. RP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess 125 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 HousE
REPORT], reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5693, 6078-79 (Congress intended
to meet goals of bankruptcy system by relieving debtors of creditor hassle and worry of
overburdening debt at time when debtors increasingly use debt to finance consumer purchases
and business ventures).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982 & Supp.III 1985)(defining circumstances under which
creditors may collect Postpetition Charges); infra text and accompanying note 12 (quoting §
506(b) of Code).
7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-303 (1982)(debtor commences bankruptcy proceeding by filing
petition for relief).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (1982)(creditors may file proofs of claim or interest claim against

1987]

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Code allows creditors to include in a proof of claim interest on the
outstanding amount of a creditor's claim that had matured prior to the
debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition. 9 The Code further provides that

creditors' claims are secured to the extent of the value of a creditor's interest
in property of the estate, or to the extent that the value of the creditor's
interest in property of the estate exceeds the amount subject to the debtor's
right of setoff.' 0 The Code's significant addition to creditors' collection

rights against bankrupt debtors, however, is that section 506(b) of the Code
appears to entitle creditors to collect Postpetition Charges in certain situations." Section 506(b) of the Code provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property
the value of which . . . is greater than the amount of such claim,

there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such
provided for under
claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges
2

the agreement under which such claim arose.1

Subsequent to the enactment of the Code, however, uncertainty has arisen
in debtor-creditor relationships regarding whether section 506(b) of the Code
effects a substantive change from the 1898 Act concerning the collection of
Postpetition Charges, or whether section 506(b) of the Code merely codifies

estates of debtors); see alsoid. § 502(a) (discussing allowability of creditor claims). Section
502 of the Code governs the allowance of creditor claims. Id. Under § 502(a) of the Code, a
proof of claim constitutes prima facia evidence of the validity and amount of the claim. 11
U.S.C. § 502(a) (1982); see FED. R. BAN-R. P. 3001(0 (creditors' proof of claim constitutes
prima facie evidence of claim). Section 502(a), therefore, allows a creditor's claim unless a
debtor objects to the claim. 11 U.S.C. 502(a) (1982); see FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(0 (creditors'
proof of claim constitutes prima facie evidence of claim). When a debtor objects to a creditor's
claim and demands that a bankruptcy court disallow the claim, however, the bankruptcy court
must resolve the dispute of whether to allow the claim based on the merits of the creditor's
claim. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007 (proof of claim and objection to proof of claim mandate
adversary proceeding).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1982). Section 502(b)(2) of the Code disallows creditor's
claims for unmatured interest. Id. When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, § 502 suspends
the accrual of interest on a creditor's claim as of the date of the petition. Id.; see 3 L. Kno,
supra note 5, § 502.02[2], at 502-30 (15th ed. 1985) (filing of bankruptcy petition suspends
accrual of interest on creditor claim).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). Section 506(a) of the Code provides that a claim by a
creditor possessing a lien against property of a debtor's bankrupt estate is a secured claim to
the extent of the value of the creditor's interest in property of the estate or to the extent that
the value of the creditor's interest in property of the estate exceeds the amount subject to the
debtor's right of setoff. Id. See Id. § 553 (discussing debtor's right to setoff claim of debtor
against claim of creditor). Section 553 of the Code allows a debtor to offset the claims that
a debtor and creditor have against one another. Id. § 553 (1982). The resulting balance
constitutes the debtor's liability to the creditor. Id.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); see infra text and accompanying note 12 (quoting § 506(b)
of Code); infra notes 84-114 and accompanying text (permitting creditors to recover Postpetition
Charges).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); cf. supra notes 3-4 (discussing Postpetition Charges under
1898 Act).
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pre-Code law.13 In Best Repair Co. v. United States14 and Mack Financial
Corp. v. Ireson,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered whether section 506(b) of the Code allows creditors to collect
Postpetition Charges. 16
In Mack, a creditor financed the purchase of a dump truck for the
debtor. 7 The installment agreement securing the debtor's obligation to the
creditor listed the truck as collateral.' s The installment agreement contained
a clause providing that the creditor would assess a five percent delinquency
charge on installments that were delinquent for more than seven days. 19 The

debtor defaulted on the truck payments and subsequently filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Code.20 At the time of default the truck
was worth more than the debtor's unpaid balance on the truck. 2' Pursuant
13. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); see S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978)

[hereinafter 1978 SENATE REPORT] reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787,
5854 (discussing Postpetition Charges under § 506(b)). The senate report on § 506(b) of the
Code provides that § 506(b) codifies pre-Code law concerning reasonable fees, costs, or charges.
1978 SENATE REPORT, supra, at 68; see United Merchants and Mfrs., Inc. v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 674 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1982)(§ 506(b) codifies preCode law); Wolohan Lumber Co. v. Robbins, 21 Bankr. 747, 751 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982)(§
506(b) codifies pre-Code law). But see Unsecured Creditor's Comm. v. Heller, 768 F.2d 580,
582-85 (4th Cir. 1985)(§ 506(b) of Code makes substantive change in pre-Code law); In re
LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 1984)(§ 506(b) of Code effects substantive
change in pre-Code law by permitting creditors to recover postpetition late charges); In re
Morrisey, 37 Bankr. 571, 572 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984)(§ 506(b) of Code makes substantive
change in pre-Code law by allowing creditors to recover postpetition interest).
14. 789 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1985).
15. 789 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1985).
16. See Best Repair Co. v. United States, 789 F.2d 1080, 1081 (4th Cir. 1985)(considering
whether § 506(b) of Code authorizes creditors to recover postpetition interest); Mack Fin.
Corp. v. Ireson, 789 F.2d 1083, 1084 (4th Cir. 1985)(considering whether § 506(b) of Code
authorizes creditors to recover postpetition late charges); supra text and accompanying note
12 (quoting § 506(b) of Code); infra notes 17-40 (discussing Mack); supranotes 41-62 (discussing
Best).
17. Ireson v. Mack Fin. Corp., 48 Bankr. 711, 711 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985). Mack
Financial Corp. financed the purchase of the truck for the debtor, Keson Trucking. Id.
18. Id. at 711.
19. Id. at 711-12.
20. Id. at 712; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Chapter 11 of the
Code provides financially distressed businesses a means to reorganize and continue business
operations, as opposed to liquidating and halting business operations. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174
(1982 & Supp. III 1985); see 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 220 (purpose of Chapter
11 is to give distressed businesses opportunity to rehabilitate financial obligations while
continuing business operations). 1977 HousE REPoRT, supra note 5, at 220. The house report
found that the rehabilitation of businesses in financial distress minimizes unemployment and
waste of business assets. Id.. Additionally, the report maintained that shareholders are less
likely to lose investment monies, and creditors may recoup the full amount of money from
loans to debtors, if the Code allows debtors to reorganize and continue business operations.
Id. The report concluded that, in the long term, rehabilitation under Chapter 11 enhances the
economy. Id.
21. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Ireson, 53 Bankr. 118, 120 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985). When the
debtor filed the bankruptcy petition in Mack, the debtor listed the value of the truck at
$35,000 and a balance due on the truck of $27,016, producing a difference of $7,984. Id.
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to a court order, 22 the debtor paid the creditor the outstanding balance on
the truck, plus postpetition late charges for the delinquency of the truck
payments. 23 When tendering payment to the creditor, however, the debtor
protested and disclaimed liability for the postpetition late charges.2 The
debtor argued that the charges which accrued after the debtor had filed the
bankruptcy petition constituted penalties and, therefore, were unenforceable
under the Code.Y The creditor claimed that section 506(b) of the Cede
authorized the enforcement of postpetition late charges.2 Considering the
application of section 506(b) of the Code, the bankruptcy court* in Mack
reasoned that section 506(b) substantively did not change the 1898 Act,
under which bankruptcy courts characterized postpetition late charges as
penalties that were unenforceable in a court of equity. 27 Accordingly, the

22. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Ireson, 48 Bankr. 711, 712 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985). The
bankruptcy court in Mack originally entered an order extending the security agreement between
the debtor and the creditor to provide the creditor the full amount of the outstanding obligation
and to provide for postpetition late charges of $688.25. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 1142(a),(b)
(1982)(bankruptcy court has authority to confirm reorganization plan and enter all orders
necessary to implement plan). The debtor failed to follow the initial court order, and the
bankruptcy court entered a second order that modified the payment plan and allowed the
court to convert the proceeding to Chapter 7 if the debtor failed to follow the second order.
Mack 48 Bankr. at 712; see 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(7),(8)(allowing court to convert Chapter 11
proceeding to Chapter 7).
23. Mack, 48 Bankr. at 712. In Mack the creditor assessed a total amount of $1187
against the debtor as late charges, which accrued from the time the debtor filed the bankruptcy
petition until the debtor paid the creditor under the modified court order. Id.. The total
amount of postpetition late charges, $1187, represented $688.25 of late charges that accrued
from the time the debtor filed for bankruptcy until the court entered the agreed order, and
$498.75 of late charges that accrued from the time the court entered the original order until
the debtor paid the creditor. Id. The debtor paid the creditor a total amount of postpetition
late charges of $1187. Id.; see supra note 22 (discussing initial and modified court orders).
24. Mack, 48 Bankr. at 712. In determining whether to allow the creditor's claim for
postpetition late charges, the bankruptcy court in Mack considered the entire amount of
postpetition late charges, $1187, even though the debtor previously had agreed to pay $688.25
in postpetition late charges in the initial court order Id. The bankruptcy court in Mack
considered the full amount of postpetition late charges because the debtor protested the entire
amount when paying the creditor. Id.; see supra note 22 (discussing initial and modified court
orders).
25. Mack, 48 Bankr. at 712-13. The debtor in Mack argued that the express language
of § 506(b) of the Code did not change pre-Code law, which characterized late charges as
penalties. Id. at 713. Accordingly, the debtor argued that the bankruptcy court, as a court of
equity, could not enforce the postpetition late charges. Id.; see supra note 3 and accompanying
text (postpetition late charges constitute penalties under 1898 Act); supra note 5 (policy of
Code is to provide equitable treatment to debtors and creditors).
26. Mack, 48 Bankr. at 712; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); see supra text and accompanying
note 12 (quoting § 506(b) of Code).
27, Mack, 48 Bankr. at 713. The bankruptcy court in Mack found that the legislative
history concerning § 506(b) of the Code demonstrated that Congress did not intend that §
506(b) change pre-Code law, which did not allow creditors to recover postpetition late charges.
Id.; see supra note 13 (legislative history of § 506 (b) provides that § 506(b) codifies pre-Code
law regarding postpetition late charges); supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (late charges
constitute penalties and are not enforceable under 1898 Act).
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bankruptcy court held that the creditor 28in Mack could not recover postpetition late charges under section 506(b).
The creditor appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the United

States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. 29 The district
court found that section 506(b) of the Code effected a change in substantive
law from the 1898 Act.30 The district court explained that the express

language of section 506(b) authorizes the allowance of postpetition late
charges when the value of a creditor's security exceeds the value of the
debt, and the amount of the postpetition late charges are reasonable.3

Finding that the value of the creditor's security in Mack exceeded the
amount of the debt, and that under Virginia law the amount of the

postpetition late charges was reasonable, 32 the district court reversed the
bankruptcy court's decision and allowed the secured creditor in Mack to
33
recover the postpetition late charges.
The debtor appealed the district court's decision to allow the creditor
to recover postpetition late charges to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. 34 On appeal the debtor argued that Congress did

not intend section 506(b) of the Code to change the substantive law of the
1898 Act regarding postpetition late charges. 35 The debtor argued that

because section 506(b) did not effect a substantive change in the 1898 Act,
a creditor could not collect postpetition late charges because such charges
constituted penalties.3 6 The Fourth Circuit rejected the debtor's contentions

and adopted the ruling of the district court in Mack that the plain language

28. Mack, 48 Bankr. at 712-14; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982). The bankruptcy court in
Mack determined that neither the express language of § 506(b) of the Code nor the legislative
history of § 506(b) effected a substantive change in law from the 1898 Act concerning creditors'
rights to recover postpetition late charges. Mack, 48 Bankr. at 713-14. In holding that creditors
cannot recover postpetition late charges, the bankruptcy court in Mack explained that under
the 1898 Act, a court of equity, such as a bankruptcy court, could not allow late charges
because late charges constituted penalties. Id. at 712; see supra notes 3-4 (bankruptcy courts
do not allow charges constituting penalties); supra note 13 (discussing legislative history of §
506(b) which states that § 506(b) codifies pre-Code law).
29. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Ireson, 53 Bankr. 118, 119 (W.D. Va. 1985).
30. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982).
31. Mack, 53 Bankr. at 120; see infra note 32 (discussing reasonable amount of late
charges).
32. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.26 (1986). The Virginia Code allows a creditor to
impose a maximum late charge on a debtor of five percent of the outstanding amount of the
debt, if the debtor and the creditor specifically contract for the late charge. Id.
33. Mack, 53 Bankr. at 120. The district court in Mack allowed the creditor to recover
postpetition late charges of $1187 because the value of the creditor's security, $35,000, exceeded
the value of the debtor's obligation to the creditor, $27,016.00, to the extent of the late
charge, and because the five percent late charge was reasonable under Virginia law. Id.; see
supra note 32 (discussing reasonable amount of late charges in Virginia).
34. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Ireson, 789 F.2d 1083, 1083 (4th Cir. 1986).
35. Id. at 1084; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982).
36. Mack, 789 F.2d at 1084; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); see supra notes 3-4 and
accompanying text (as courts of equity, bankruptcy courts do not allow creditors to collect
charges that constitute penalties).
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of section 506(b) entitles creditors to recover postpetition late charges when
a creditor is oversecured and the charge is reasonable. 37 The Fourth Circuit

added, however, that section 506(b) requires that the debtor and creditor
contractually agree to any late charges.3 8 In examining the facts of Mack,
the Fourth Circuit found that the creditor was oversecured, the amount of
the late charge was reasonable, and the debtor specifically had agreed to
the late charge. 39 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit in Mack held that section

506(b) allowed the creditor to retain the full amount of postpetition late
charges that the creditor had collected from the debtor. 40

The Fourth Circuit expanded its interpretation of section 506(b) of the
Code in Best Repair Co. v. United States.41 In Best, the Fourth Circuit
considered whether section 506(b) of the Code authorizes creditors to collect
postpetition interest. 42 The debtor in Best filed a petition for reorganization

under Chapter 11 of the Code. 43 The government subsequently filed proofs

of claims for unpaid taxes that the debtor owed and for penalties and
interest on the unpaid taxes, and obtained a lien on the debtor's real
property to secure the amount of the outstanding tax claim. 44 The govern-

37. Mack, 789 F.2d at 1083 (4th Cir. 1986); 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982). The Fourth
Circuit in Mack explained that Congress intended that the express language of § 506(b) of the
Code substantively change pre-Code law by allowing creditors to recover postpetition late
charges. Mack, 789 F.2d at 1084; see 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 68 (discussing
legislative history of § 506(b)). In the Senate Report Congress stated that § 506(b) of the Code
codified current law by allowing secured creditors any reasonable charges that the debtor
agreed to pay the creditor. Mack, 789 F.2d at 1084. The Fourth Circuit in Mack, however,
declared that the legislative history of § 506(b) did not demonstrate that Congress intended to
continue the practice of disallowing postpetition late charges under the 1898 Act. Id. at 1084;
see 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982) (expressly allowing postpetition late charges); supra notes 2-4
and accompanying text (discussing charges allowed to creditors under 1898 Act).
38. Mack, 789 F.2d at 1084; see 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982) (providing for postpetition
late charges). Unlike the district court in Mack, the Fourth Circuit explained that the express
language of § 506(b) of the Code, in addition to requiring that a creditor be oversecured and
the late charge be reasonable, requires that the debtor specifically agree to pay the late charge
to the creditor. Mack, 789 F.2d at 1084.
39. Mack, 789 F.2d at 1084. The Fourth Circuit in Mack found that the value of the
creditor's security was $35,000, while the value of the debtor's obligation to the creditor was
only $27,016. Id. at 1083. The Mack court further found that the five percent late charge in
the security agreement between the debtor and the creditor did not exceed the five percent
maximum late charge on outstanding debts that Virginia law allowed. Id.; see supra note 32
(discussing maximfum late charge under Virginia law).
40. Mack, 789 F.2d at 1084; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982).
41. 789 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1986).
42. Id. at 1081.
43. Best Repair Co. v. United States, 50 Bankr. 386, 386 (E.D. Va. 1985); see 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1174 (1982)(providing for reorganization of business finances); supra note 20 (discussing
purpose of Chapter 11 relief).
44. Best Repair Co. v. United States, 50 Bankr. 386, 386; see 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6322
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)(lien against real and personal property of taxpayer arises in favor of
United States when government assesses tax). In Best the government claimed that the debtor
owed a total amount of $57,838.26, which consisted of $7146.46 in taxes, $19,220.43 in late
payment penalties, and $31,489.06 in interest on the taxes and penalties that accrued before
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ment claimed that the language of section 506(b) permitted the government
to recover interest on the unpaid taxes that accrued after the debtor filed
the petition for relief. 4 Arguing that the language of section 506(b) does
not authorize creditors to recover postpetition interest, the debtor objected
to the government's claim of postpetition interest. 46 The debtor further
argued that permitting a creditor to recover postpetition interest on the
outstanding balance of a debt violates the equitable policy of the Code that
one creditor should not benefit at the expense of another through a delay
in administering the estate. 47 In considering the debtor's arguments, the
bankruptcy court found that the plain language of section 506(b) of the
Code clearly authorizes oversecured creditors to collect postpetition interest
on outstanding claims. 4 The bankruptcy court further found that Congress
intended section 506(b) to strengthen the rights of oversecured creditors.49
The bankruptcy court in Best held, therefore, that section 506(b) of the
Code entitled the government to recover postpetition interest because the
value of the governments security exceeded the amount of the government's

tax claim, which included the postpetition interest.5 0
The debtor appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia."' The district court
recognized that allowing postpetition interest under section 506(b) of the
Code when no consensual agreement for the postpetition interest exists
violates the equitable policies of the Code.5 2 The district court then inter-

the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition. Best, 50 Bankr. at 386. In addition to the $57,838.26
in taxes, penalties and prepetition interest in the proof of claim, the government in Best,
pursuant to § 506(b) of the Code, sought to collect approximately $10,000 in interest that
accrued from the time the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition until the debtor ultimately paid
the government. Best Repair Co. v. United States, 789 F.2d 1080, 1081 (4th Cir. 1985); see
11 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6322 (1982 & Supp III 1985)(government secures tax lien by filing notice
of lien, without resort to judicial process); see also supra note 8 (creditor may file proofs of
claim against estate of debtor).
45. Best, 50 Bankr. at 38646. See Best Repair Co. v. United States, 51 Bankr. 33, 34 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); 11
U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982)(debtor filed motion to determine tax liability to United States in
bankruptcy court). The debtor in Best argued that the language of § 506(b) required a debtor
and creditor to agree specifically to interest on an outstanding debt. Best, 51 Bankr. at 34.
47. Best Repair Co. v. United States, 50 Bankr. 386, 386-87 (E.D. Va. 1985); see supra
note 4 (discussing policy considerations against allowing postpetition interest on nonconsensual
debts).
48. Best Repair Co. v. United States, 51 Bankr. 33, 34 (Bankr. F.D. Va. 1985); 11
U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982).
49. Best, 51 Bankr. at 34.
50. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982).
51. Best Repair Co. v. United States, 50 Bankr. 386, 386 (E.D. Va. 1985).
52. Best, 50 Bankr. at 386-87. The district court in Best reasoned that creditors should
not benefit from the delay in the administration of a bankrupt estate which the allowance of
postpetition interest could cause. Id.; see United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719, 723 (4th
Cir. 1959)(discussing equitable considerations in denying postpetition interest on nonconsensual
claim); supra note 4 (allowing postpetition interest permits creditors to recover greater proportion of bankrupt estate).
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preted the express language of section 506(b) as authorizing a creditor to
collect postpetition interest only when a consensual agreement for postpetition interest exists between the debtor and the government. 3 Accordingly,
the district court in Best found that because no consensual contract for
postpetition interest existed between the debtor and the government, the
4
government could not collect the postpetition interest on the tax claim.1
The government appealed the district court's disallowance of postpetition
interest to the Fourth Circuit." On appeal the Fourth Circuit considered
the language of section 506(b) of the Code and determined that the plain
meaning of section 506(b) clearly provides that a creditor may collect
postpetition interest on a nonconsensual interest claim when the value of
the creditor's security exceeds the amount of the creditor's claim. 56 In
construing section 506(b) of the Code, the Fourth Circuit in Best realized
that commas and the clause "and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges"
("charges clause") separate the clause "interest on such claim" ("interest
clause") from the clause "provided for under such agreement" ("agreement
clause").17 The Best court, therefore, explained that the agreement clause
does not modify the interest clause." Consequently, the Best court determined that a creditor need not base the creditor's postpetition interest claim
on a consensual agreement between the debtor and creditor. 9 The Best
court noted that Congress, in drafting section 506(b), easily could have
provided that postpetition interest requires a consensual agreement between
the debtor and creditor. 60 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
district court in Best that the legislative history of section 506(b) is inconclusive regarding whether creditors can collect postpetition interest on nonconsensual interest claims. 61 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit found that
53. Id. at 386-87; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); see supra text accompanying note 12

(quoting § 506(b) of Code). The district court in Best found that the legislative history of §
506(b) of the Code did not provide any insight into Congress' intended meaning of § 506(b)
concerning postpetition interest. Best, 50 Bankr. at 388; see 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note
13, at 68 (Senate Report on § 506(b) of Code makes no reference to interest); 1977 Housa
REPORT, supra note 5, at 356-57 (House Report on § 506(b) makes no reference to interest).

The district court in Best further found that a reasonable construction of the language in §
506(b) of the Code demonstrates that the phrase "provided for under the agreement"
("agreement phrase") modifies the phrase "interest on such claim" ("interest phrase") even
though commas set off the interest phrase from the agreement phrase. Best 50 Bankr. at 387;
11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982). But see infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (agreement phrase

does not
54.
55.
56.

modify interest phrase).
Best, 50 Bankr. at 388.
Best Repair Co. v. United States, 789 F.2d 1080, 1081 (4th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1081-82 (4th Cir. 1986); 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); see supra text accompanying

note 12 (quoting pertinent language of § 506(b)).
57. Best, 789 F.2d at 1082.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at n.2.
61. See id. at 1082 (noting that legislative history of § 506(b) of Code makes no reference
to interest); supra note 53 (discussing legislative history of § 506(b) concerning postpetition
interest).
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because the value of the government's security in Best exceeded the value

of the government's claim against the debtor to the extent of the amount
of the postpetition interest claim, the government could not recover the full

amount of the postpetition interest on the government's claim under section
506(b) of the Code. 62

The Fourth Circuit correctly allowed the oversecured creditors in Mack
and Best respectively to recover reasonable postpetition late charges under
a consensual agreement 6 and postpetition interest on a nonconsensual
interest claim.64 Because of the paucity of case law concerning whether
section 506(b) of the Code allows creditors to recover Postpetition Charges,
courts necessarily should rely on traditional rules of statutory construction
to interpret section 506(b). 65 One rule of statutory construction requires that
when the language of a statute is unambiguous, and interpretation of the
statutory language by proper construction rules does not produce unreasonable results, the language of the statute controls the meaning of the statute,
especially in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary ("Plain

Language Rule")." When the language of a statute is ambiguous, however,
the legislative history of the statute is necessary to interpret the statute. 67
Accordingly, applying the Plain Language Rule to section 506(b) of the
Code mandates that the unambiguous language concerning Postpetition
6
Charges governs the interpretation of section 506(b). 1

Allowing the unambiguous language of section 506(b) to govern the
interpretation of section 506(b) nonetheless requires the application of
various doctrines of statutory construction. 69 The doctrine of reddendo
singula singulis declares that a modifying phrase within a statute refers to
70
the preceding phrase with which the modifying phrase logically connects.

62. Best, 789 F.2d at 1081-82. The parties in Best agreed that the value of government's
security exceeded value of the government's claim. Id. See supra note 44 (discussing value of
government's security and government's claim).
63. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's holding in
Mack that § 506(b) authorizes creditors to recover postpetition late charges).
64. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's holding in
Best that § 506(b) authorizes creditors to recover postpetition interest).
65. See infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of § 506(b)
of Code under traditional rules of statutory construction).
66. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)(statutory language initially
controls meaning of statute); see also 2A N. SINGER, SUTr AND STATUTORY CONsTRUCTON
§ 46.04 (4th ed. 1984)(when language of statute is clear and unambiguous, court should give
effect to literal meaning of statutory language without examining other indicia of statutory
intent).
67. See 2A N. SINGER, supra note 66, at § 46.01 (when language of statute is ambiguous,
courts examine alternative sources to indicate intent, including legislative history of statute).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); see infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text (language
of section 506(b) of Code is unambiguous); supra note 66 (unambiguous language of statute
controls meaning of statute).
69. See 2A N. SINGER, supra note 66, at § 46.01 (courts should consult rules of statutory
construction when interpreting statute).
70. See Mclung v. Kingsland, 14 U.S. (I How.) 567, 572 (1843)(modifying phrase within
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Similarly, the doctrine of prior antecedents requires that a modifying phrase
relates to the immediately preceding phrase. 71 In addition, a modifying
phrase generally does not refer to all antecedents in a statute unless a
comma separates the modifying phrase from the immediately preceding
antecedent ("modifying phrase rule"). 72 Applying the doctrines of reddendo
singula singulis and prior antecedents to interpret the meaning of section
506(b) demonstrates that the modifying phrase "provided for under the
agreement" ("agreement phrase") refers to the phrase "any reasonable fees,
costs or charges" ("charges phrase") because the charges phrase immediately
precedes the agreement phrase and the phrases logically connect.7 3 Applying
the modifying phrase rule to interpret the meaning of section 506(b) demonstrates that the agreement phrase does not modify the antecedent phrase
"interest on such claim" ("interest phrase") because no comma exists
between the agreement phrase and the immediately preceding antecedent,
the charges phrase. 74 Accordingly, the agreement phrase only refers to the
charges phrase. 7 Rules of statutory construction, therefore, demonstrate
that section 506(b) of the Code allows creditors to recover: (1) postpetition
late charges when an agreement that provides for late charges exists between
a debtor and creditor; and (2) postpetition interest even if no agreement
for the postpetition interest exists between a debtor and creditor to the
extent that the amount of the creditor's security exceeds the value of the
debt. 76 Furthermore, construing section 506(b) of the Code to allow Postpetition Charges does not produce unreasonable results because allowing
creditors to recover Postpetition Charges complies with Congress' goal of

statute refers to logically connecting preceding phrase); 2A N. SINGER, supra note 66, at §
47.26 (discussing doctrine of reddendo singula singulis).
71. See Buscaglia v. Bowie, 139 F.2d 294, 298 (1st Cir. 1943)(modifying phrase modifies
immediately preceding phrase under doctrine of prior antecedent); see also 2A N. SINGER,
supra note 66, at § 47.33 (doctrine of prior antecedents provides that modifying phrase modifies
immediately preceding phrase).
72. See Service Invest. Co. v. Dorst, 232 Wis. 574, 228 N.W. 169, 170 (1939)(no comma
separating modifying phrase from immediately preceding phrase indicates modifying phrase
modifies only immediately preceding phrase, not all preceding phrases); see also 2A N. SINGER,
supra note 66, at § 47.33 (modifying phrase refers to all antecedent phrases only when comma
separates modifying phrase from immediately preceding antecedent phrase).
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); supra text accompanying note 12 (quoting § 506 (b)
of Code)(charges phrase is antecedent of agreement phrase and no comma separates charges
phrase from agreement phrase); supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of
prior antecedents); supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of reddendo
singula singulis).
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982)(no comma separates agreement phrase from charges
phrase and comma separates charges phrase from interest phrase); supra text accompanying
note 12 (quoting § 506(b) of Code); supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing modifying
phrase rule).
75. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (agreement phrase modifies charges
phrase and not interest phrase).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); see supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (discussing
interpretation of § 506(b) under rules of statutory construction).
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protecting a creditor, but does not sacrifice the primary purpose of bank77
ruptcy law, which is to rehabilitate a debtor's finances,
Although the language of section 506(b) of the Code appears unambiguous and arguably produces results consistent with the policies of the Code,
a court that ignores the plain language of section. 506(b) could find that
the legislative history of the House version concerning section 506(b) denies
creditors the right to recover postpetition late charges. 78 The House version
of section 506(b) expressly included a provision retaining pre-Code law
concerning "reasonable fees, costs, and charges". 79 The Senate version of
section 506(b), however, made no reference concerning the retention of preCode law.80 In adopting the current version of section 506(b) of the Code,
therefore, Congress demonstrated an intent to make a substantive change
in pre-Code law, which did not allow creditors to recover postpetition late
charges.81 Consequently, the legislative history of section 506(b) demonstrates
a clear legislative intent concerning postpetition late charges.8 2 Even if a
court is unable to discern a sufficiently clear legislative intent regarding
postpetition late charges, the plain meaning of section 506(b)'s language
should permit creditors to recover Postpetition Charges. 3
77. 11 U.S.C, § 506(b) (1982); supra note 5 (primary goal of bankruptcy is to rehabilitate
debtor's finances and secondary goal of bankruptcy is to provide creditor total value of
outstanding debt).
78. See 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 356-57 (discussing § 506(b) of Code
regarding Postpetition Charges). The house report concerning § 506(b) of the Code states that
§ 506(b) codified pre-Code law. Id.; see also supra notes 3-4 (late charges constituted penalties
under 1898 Act and are not enforceable in courts of equity); see infra notes 78-83 (discussing
legislative history regarding late charges).
79. See H.R. REP. No. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 393 § 506(b) (1977), reprinted in 12
N. REsNICK & E. Wypysr, BANKRUPTCY REFoRM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, doc.
41, at 387 (1979). The House version of § 506(b) of the Code expressly provided that "there
shall be allowed to the holder of such claim to the extent collectible under applicable law...
any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under the agreement under which guch claim
arose." Id. (emphasis added).
80. See S. REP. No. 2266, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 394 (1977), reprinted in 14 N. RESNICK
& . WYPYsKi, supra note 79, doc. 46, at 86. The Senate version of § 506(b) provided that
"there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim . . . any reasonable fees, costs, or charges
provided under the agreement under which such claim arose." Id. The compromise version of
506(b) adopted the Senate language, with minor changes. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); see KIee,
Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAuL L. REv, 941, 949-55 (1979)
(Senate rejected House language of 506(b) and House agreed to change in House version of
506(b)). Accordingly, the Senate version of § 506(b) controls the meaning of § 506(b) as the
full House of Congress enacted Senate version. See 2A N. SINGER, supra note 66, at § 48.04
(when conflict exists between what committee in House of Congress does at one point in time
and what full House of Congress does later, actions of full House of Congress must govern);
see also Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Heller, 768 F.2d 580, 583-85 (4th Cir. 1985)(Congress
adopted Senate version of § 506(b)).
81. See supra note 80 (Congress rejected provision of § 506(b) of Code retaining preCode law).
82. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (legislative history of § 506(b) of Code
clearly provides that creditors may recover postpetition late charges).
83. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text (language of § 506(b) of Code is clear
and unambiguous).
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In addition to the guidance that traditional rules of statutory construction
and legislative history provide in interpreting section 506(b) of the Code,
several courts have considered the meaning of section 506(b).14 In In re
LHD Realty Corp.,"- the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit considered whether a creditor could recover postpetition late charges
under section 506(b) of the Code. 6 In LHD Realty, a debtor assumed the
indebtedness on a promissory note and mortgage securing the note.8 7 The
note provided that the creditor could recover late charges equal to four
percent of the amount of the aggregate monthly installment that the debtor
did not pay within ten days of the due date.88 Eight years after assuming
the promissory note and mortgage, the debtor filed for relief under Chapter
11 of the Code. 9 Subsequent to the debtor's petition for relief, the debtor
failed to pay installments on the principal amount of the note and late
charges for the delinquency of the installments. 90 In considering whether
section 506(b) allows creditors to recover postpetition late charges, the
district court in LHD Realty found that Congress did not intend that section
506(b) effect a substantive change in pre-Code law concerning postpetition
late charges and that, therefore, creditors could not recover these charges. 91
On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the express language
of section 506(b) authorizes oversecured creditors to collect reasonable
postpetition late charges when a consensual agreement exists between the
debtor and creditor for the late charges. 92 The LHD Realty court reversed
the district court's holding because the debtor never appealed the decision

84. See infra notes 85-114 and accompanying text (discussing judicial consideration of
whether § 506(b) of Code allows Postpetition Charges). 85. 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1984).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 328. The creditor in LHD Realty was the assignee of a note valued at $775,000.
Id. at 329. A mortgage on an office building secured the note. Id. The debtor assumed the
mortgage, which provided that the mortgagor pay monthly installments on the note for 15
years. Id.
88. In re LHD Realty Corp., 20 Bankr. 722, 724 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982). In LHD
Realty the purpose of the late charges in the note was to cover the added expense of handling
delinquent installments. Id.
89. In re LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327, 329-30 (7th Cir. 1984). After the debtor in
LHD Realty filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court granted the debtor's request to sell
the secured property. Id. at 329. The creditor objected to the debtor's request and sought to
lift the automatic stay and execute against the secured property in state court. Id. at 330. The
bankruptcy court denied the creditor relief from the automatic stay and approved the sale of
the property because the proposed sale price of the secured property exceeded the value of
the outstanding debt that the property secured. Id.
90. Id., 726 F.2d at 329. After filing for relief under Chapter 11, the debtor in LHD
Realty made monthly mortgage payments to the creditor for nine months. Id. The payments
were late each of the nine months. Id. The debtor failed to make any monthly mortgage
payments after nine months. Id.
91. In re LHD Realty Corp., 20 Bankr. 722, 725 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982).
92. In re LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 1984); 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)
(1982). The Seventh Circuit in LHD Realty realized that the express language in § 506(b) of
the Code changed pre-Code law by allowing late charges. Id.
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of the bankruptcy court in LHD Realty, which allowed the creditor to
recover postpetition late charges. 93 The LHD Realty court noted in dicta,

nonetheless, that because the value of the secured creditor's interest in the
debtor's property exceeded the amount of the debtor's outstanding obligation, a consensual agreement for late charges existed between the debtor

and creditor, and the late charges were reasonable, the creditor could collect
postpetition late charges under section 506(b). 94 In determining the reason-

ableness of the postpetition late charges, the LHD Realty court explained
that state law determines the reasonableness of the charges when state law
provides for late charges. 95

In addition to the Seventh Circuit's finding regarding postpetition late
charges, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has

considered whether section 506(b) of the Code allows postpetition interest
when an oversecured creditor's claim for postpetition interest is nonconsensual. 96 In Cardinal Savings and Loan Association v. Colegrove,97 a debtor

and creditor executed a mortgage agreement on the debtor's home to secure
the creditor's loan to the debtor. 9 The mortgage agreement did not provide
for postpetition interest if the debtor defaulted on the note. 99 The debtor

defaulted on the note and subsequently filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
13 of the Code.10 The debtor proposed a payment plan under Chapter 13

93. LHD Realty, 726 F.2d at 333. Although the debtor in LHD Realty never appealed
the bankruptcy court's holding to allow the creditor to recover postpetition late charges, the
district court in LHD Realty reversed the holding of the bankruptcy court and did not allow
the creditor to recover postpetition late charges. Id.
94. Id. at 333; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982). After the LHD Realty court considered the
debtor's appeal concerning prepayment premiums, it found in dicta that the express provisions
of § 506(b) of the Code allow oversecured creditors to recover postpetition late charges when
a consensual agreement providing for the late charges exists between a debtor and the creditor.
Id.

95. LHD Realty, 726 F.2d at 333 n.8. In determining the reasonableness of late charges,
the LHD Realty court noted that Indiana state law provides for late charges to reimburse
creditors for the added expense of handling delinquent payments. Id. See INn. CODE ANm. §
24-4.5-3-203 (Burns 1974) (allowing late charges at a maximum rate of five percent of
outstanding payments); cf. Mellon Bank v. Sholos, 11 Bankr. 782, 785-86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1981) (when state law does not provide for reasonableness of late charges, bankruptcy judge
determines reasonableness of late charge).
96. See Cardinal Sav. and Loan Assoc. v. Colegrove, 771 F.2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1985).
97. Id. at 121.
98. Id. at 120. In Colegrove the debtor's home which had a value of $55,000, secured
the debtor's outstanding obligation of $2967.60 to the creditor. Id. at 121.
99. Id. at 120.
100. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Chapter 13 relief attempts
to provide for the financial rehabilitation of individual debtors with regular income. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1330 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Under Chapter 13 of the Code, debtors formulate a
payment plan under which they apply a portion of future earnings to outstanding debts until
the debtor either satisfies the debts or complies with the terms of the plan. Id. § 1307. The
purpose of Chapter 13 is to allow a debtor to achieve financial rehabilitation while retaining
the debtor's assets, as opposed to having to resort to Chapter 7 liquidation. See 1977 HousE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 220 (discussing purpose of Chapter 13 of Code); 11 U.S.C. §§ 701766 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(requiring liquidation of debtor's assets to satisfy debts).
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that required the debtor to pay all past due mortgage payments.' 0 ' The
payment plan, however, omitted interest on the past due mortgage payments
from the time the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition until the effective
date of the reorganization plan.'2 The creditor objected to the proposed
plan and argued that section 506(b) of the Code authorized the creditor to
recover postpetition interest. 10 3 The creditor further argued that, in the
alternative, section 1325 of the Code allowed the creditor to recover interest
on the outstanding debt. ' 4 The Colegrove court held that unsecured creditors
can recover postpetition interest in a Chapter 13 proceeding under section
1325 of the Code. 05 The Colegrove court noted in dicta, however, that the
language of section 506(b) of the Code provides that a debtor and creditor
need not agree to the creditor's recovery of postpetition interest on the
°6
outstanding amount of the debt for the creditor to recover such interest.'
The Colegrove court recognized that section 506(b) must at least protect
the rights of secured creditors to the extent that section 1325 protects the
rights of unsecured creditors.c 7 Thus, although the Colegrove court held
that a creditor can recover postpetition interest under section 1325, the
Colegrove court recognized that section 506(b), like section 1325, allowed
creditors to receive the full value of the creditor's claim, including postpetition interest.108
In addition to the Fourth Circuit in Best and the Sixth Circuit in
Colegrove, lower courts have considered whether section 506(b) of the Code
101. CardinalFed. Sav. and Loan Assoc. v. Colegrove, 771 F.2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1985);
see 11 U.S.C. § 1307 (1982)(debtor proposes payment plan in Chapter 13 proceeding); 11
U.S.C. § 1322 (providing for contents of Chapter 13 plan).
102. Colegrove, 771 F.2d at 120. The creditor in Colegrove claimed $2967.60 in interest
that accrued on the note from the time the debtor filed for bankruptcy until the effective date
of the reorganization plan. Id. In holding that the creditor could not collect postpetition
interest, the bankruptcy court in Colegrove reasoned that the creditor had no contractual or
statutory right to the postpetition interest. Id. Relying on the bankruptcy court's reasoning
that creditors had no contractual or statutory right to postpetition interest, the district court
in Colegrove affirmed the bankruptcy court's disallowance of postpetition interest. Id.
103. Id. at 121; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982).
104. Colegrove 771 F.2d at 121; 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982). Under § 1325 of the Code, a
court cannot approve a debtor's proposed repayment plan if: (1) a creditor objects to the plan
and the value of the creditor's claim exceeds the value of the property that the debtor proposes
to use to extinguish the debt under the plan; or (2) the debtor has projected disposable income
that the debtor does not propose to apply to future payments under the plan. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b)(1)(A)-(B); see 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (b)(2)(defining disposable income).
105. Colegrove, 771 F.2d at 122; 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982).
106. Colegrove, 771 F.2d at 122; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982).
107. Id. at 122; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982). The Colegrove court
noted that allowing an unsecured creditor to collect postpetition interest under § 1325 of the
Code and denying an oversecured creditor postpetition interest under § 506(b) of the Code
would violate the equitable policy of the Code that provides for equitable treatment of
creditors. Colegrove, 771 F.2d at 122; see 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982)(allowing oversecured
creditors to recover postpetition interest); 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982)(allowing unsecured creditors
to recover postpetition interest); supra note 5 (policy of Code is equitable treatment of
creditors).
108. Colegrove, 771 F.2d at 122 n.3; 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982).
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authorizes creditors to recover postpetition interest when a debtor and
creditor do not agree to the interest. °9 For example, in a case analogous
to Best, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
New York considered whether the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") could
collect postpetition interest on a tax lien. 10 In In re Busman, 1' the debtor
owed the IRS $4050.97 in back taxes when the debtor filed for relief under
Chapter 13 of the Code." 2 The IRS obtained a tax lien on the debtor's real
property, and the value of the property that the lien secured exceeded the

value of the IRS' claim."' Reasoning that section 506(b) of the Code
disallows claims for unmatured interest only, and that the plain language
of section 506(b) of the Code allows interest on claims to the extent that
the creditor is oversecured, the bankruptcy court held that the creditor

could collect the postpetition interest even4 though the debtor and creditor
did not agree to the postpetition interest."
In addition to rules of statutory construction and judicial holdings that
allow a creditor to collect Postpetition Charges, policy considerations also

demonstrate that section 506(b) of the Code should permit a creditor to
recover Postpetition Charges."' Allowing a creditor to collect Postpetition
Charges gives creditors the full value of an outstanding debt by compensating

creditors for the loss of the use of the creditors' money. 1 6 In addition,

allowing creditors to collect Postpetition Charges provides creditors with a

means to pay collection costs without infringing on the principal amount
of a debt or the interest earned on a debt." 7 Furthermore, allowing creditors
109. See Hoffman v. Internal Revenue Serv., 28 Bankr. 503, 508 (Bankr. Md. 1983)(granting
postpetition interest on several tax liens even though debtor and creditor did not agree to
interest); In re Loveridge Mach. and Tool Co., 9 Co~uiPR BzANr. CAs. 2d (MB) 1329, 1332
(Bankr. Utah 1983)(allowing postpetition interest on nonconsensual, oversecured claim even
though debtor and creditor did not agree to interest); In re Busman, 5 Bankr. 332, 337 (Bankr.
E.E.N.Y. 1980)(allowing postpetition interest on oversecured tax lien). But see In re Stack
Steel and Supply Co., 28 Bankr. 151, 154 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983)(denying IRS postpetition
interest on secured tax lien because debtor and creditor did not agree to interest).
110. See In re Busman, 5 Bankr. 332, 334 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982).
111. 5 Bankr. 332 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1980).
112. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1301-1330 (1982); see supra note 100 (discussing Chapter 13).
113. In re Busman, 5 Bankr. 332, 334 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1980). The value of the property
securing the government's tax lien in Busman, $5000, was greater than the government's claim
of $4050.97. Id. See 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982)(discussing process by which government obtains
tax lien); see supra note 44 (discussing government tax lien).
114. Busman, 5 Bankr. at 335-37; 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982). The Busman court reasoned
that the unequivocal language of § 506(b) authorizes an oversecured creditors to recover
postpetition interest even though a creditor's claim for interest is nonconsensual. Id. at 337.
115. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (policy considerations support allowance
of postpetition late charges and interest).
116. See 3 L. Kno, supra note 5, § 506.06 at 506-49 (15th ed. 1985) (allowing postpetition
interest gives creditor benefit of bargain). Disallowing postpetition interest causes a creditor
to lose interest on the amount of the outstanding debt because of the time lag between the
debtor's filing of the bankruptcy petition and the debtor's paying the debt. Id.
117. See Sanders v. Federal Nat'l Mort. Assoc., 373 F.Supp. 738, 741 (E.D. La.
1975)(refusing postpetition late charges causes creditor to use money from outstanding debt to
pay for extra costs in handling delinquent accounts).
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to recover postpetition charges provides debtors with greater incentive to
pay debts." 8
Although significant policy considerations support the allowance of
Postpetition Charges, contrary arguments exist that support the disallowance
of Postpetition Charges."19 Disallowing Postpetition Charges may prevent
priority creditors from collecting a greater percentage of the security's value
at the expense of subordinate creditors. 20 In addition, disallowing Postpetition Charges precludes creditors from profiting through delay in the
administration of a bankruptcy estate and decreases the complexity of
administering the estate by eliminating the need to recompute the value of
creditors' claims .'2 However, considering the policy considerations in light
of the legislative history and judicial interpretations of section 506(b) of the
Code demonstrates that section 506(b) authorizes creditors to recover Postpetition Charges.1'2
In addition to the policy considerations of allowing Postpetition Charges
in debtor-creditor relationships, the recovery of such charges is consistent
with Congress' goals of the Code.'2 The allowance of Postpetition Charges
admittedly results in a transfer of money from debtors to secured priority
lienholders and, therefore, arguably contradicts Congress' express goal of
the Code to rehabilitate a debtor's financial condition.124 The recovery of

118. See id. The Sanders court determined that allowing creditors to recover late charges
gives debtors incentive to pay debts on time because delays in payment cause debtors to forfeit
more money). Id.
119. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons against
allowing creditors to recover postpetition late charges and postpetition interest).
120. See Wolohan Lumber Company v. Robbins, 21 Bankr. 747, 751 (Bankr. SD. Ohio
1982)(alowing priority creditors to recover postpetition interest depletes funds which otherwise
are available to subordinate creditors).
121. See Note, Post-PetitionInterest on Tax Claims in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 36 TAx
LAw 793, 793 (1983)(discussing policy reasons for disallowing Postpetition Charges). Allowing
creditors to recover Postpetition Charges complicates administration of an estate because courts
must continually recompute creditor claims. Id. Additionally, delay in the administration of
an estate permits creditors to profit through the recovery of Postpetition Charges. Id.; supra
note 4 (allowing creditors to recover Postpetition Charges complicates administration of estate
and permits creditors to profit through delay in administration).
122. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of §
506(b) of Code); supra notes 84-114 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretations
of § 506(b)); supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text (discussing policy considerations of §
506(b)).
123. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (discussing consistency of allowing
Postpetition Charges with Congress' goals under Code); supra note 5 (discussing Congress'
goals under Code).
124. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982). Through the Code, Congress allows debtors to exclude
propeyty from the bankrupt estate. Id. Property that a debtor validly excludes from the estate
is not available to the debtor's creditors for the satisfaction of outstanding creditor claims.
Id. The purpose of allowing a debtor to exclude property from the bankrupt estate is to give
the debtor the property necessary to gain a fresh start after bankruptcy. See 1977 HousE
REPORT, supra note 5,at 125 (excluding property from reach of creditors facilitates rehabilitation of debtor's finances); supra note 5 (primary goal of Code isrehabilitation of debtors'
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Postpetition Charges, however, significantly will advance another express
goal of Congress, which is to allow creditors the full value of outstanding
claims by permitting creditors to realize the benefit of the bargain between
a debtor and the creditor. 125 Allowing Postpetition Charges, therefore, may
encourage better borrowing practices as debtors must exercise greater restraint in obtaining credit because creditors can obtain a greater percentage
of the bankrupt estate. Similarly, the shifting of money from subordinate
creditors to secured, priority creditors facilitates better lending practices by
encouraging creditors to secure adequate collateral before extending credit
to a person who is a poor credit risk. Allowing creditors to recover
Postpetition Charges gives creditors who exercise wise credit policies a
greater opportunity to recover the full amount of outstanding debt, and
penalizes only those creditors who use poor credit practices.126
Given the strong policy considerations and potential effect of deterring
poor lending practices, the Fourth Circuit's holdings in Mack and Best that
creditors may recover Postpetition Charges provide a well reasoned solution
to the modern problems of debtor-creditor relationships. 27 Although complications may arise in administering a bankrupt estate, debtors will not
28
emerge from bankruptcy with assets that equitably belong to creditors.
In addition, permitting creditors to recover Postpetition Charges is in accord
with Congressional goals of the Code, which are to facilitate debtors'
financial rehabilitation and provide equitable treatment to creditors. 29 Accordingly, other jurisdictions should follow the Fourth Circuit's holdings in
Mack and Best to protect creditors and encourage the use of discretion on
behalf of debtors regarding credit acquisition.
STmHN H. THOMAS

financial condition); see also Vanston Bankholders Protective Comm. v. Greene, 329 U.S. 156,
166 (1946)(allowing Postpetition Charges transfers money from debtor's estate and junior
creditors to senior creditors); Wolohan Lumber Co. v. Robbins, 21 Bankr. 747, 751 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982)(allowing Postpetition Charges transfers money from junior creditors to senior
creditors).
125. See 3 L. KiNG, supra note 5, § 506.05 at 506-49 (15th ed. 1985) (policy of § 506(b)
is to provide benefit of bargain to creditors); supra note 5 (policy of Code is to provide
equitable treatment to creditors).
126. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (allowing Postpetition Charges is
consistent with goals of bankruptcy); supra note 5 (discussing policy of Code).
127. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Ireson, 789 F.2d 1083, 1084 (4th Cir. 1986); Best Repair Co. v.
United States, 789 F.2d 1080, 1082-83 (4th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying
text (discussing Mack court's holding permitting creditors to recover postpetition late charges);
supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (discussing Best court's holding permitting creditors
to recover postpetition interest); supra notes 115-22 amd accompanying text (discussing policy
considerations of § 506(b) of Code).
128. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (allowing Postpetition Charges permits
creditors to recover value of investment); supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text (discussing
complications in administering estate when creditors recover Postpetition Charges).
129. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (allowing Postpetition Charges is
consistent with policies of Code); supra note 5 (discussing policies of Code).
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Robins v. Piccinin: The Fourth Circuit'sResponse to Bankruptcy and
Mass Tort

Congress established Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act' (the
"Code") to facilitate the reorganization of financially distressed business
enterprises. 2 Chapter 11 effectuates congressional intent to facilitate reorganization by allowing a debtor to continue to operate as a business entity

after the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy,3 and by allowing a debtor
to defer the payment of debts to creditors pursuant to a court-approved
plan.4 The feasibility of a Chapter 11 reorganization, however, relies heavily

1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982). Congress initiated bankruptcy reform in 1970 by creating
the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (the "Commission") to analyze
and recommend changes to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970); see Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). The
Commission recognized that the function of the bankruptcy process is to provide debtors relief
from debts and to effectuate a meaningful fresh start for debtors and, simultaneously, to protect
the position of the bankrupt debtors' creditors in an open credit economy. REPORT OF THE
COMM'N ON TnHBAMxRupTcY LAW OF T=E UNrrE= STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. I, at 71 (1973). The Commission ultimately adopted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 (the "Code"). 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. V 1985), amended by Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
2. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 [hereinafter 1978 HousE REPORT],
reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 5963, 5968. The House Report on the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 noted that individuals, as well as businesses, may petition
for relief under Chapter 11 of the Code. Id. The House Report explained, however, that the
procedures of Chapter 11 impose a sufficient burden to make the availability of Chapter 11
relief feasible generally in the business context only. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 [hereinafter 1978 SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN.
NEWS 5789, 5795.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (1982). Under the Code a debtor may, after filing for relief under
Chapter 11, continue to operate the debtor's business as a debtor in possession, unless the
court otherwise orders. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108 (1982). The Code affords a debtor in
possession the rights and powers of a Chapter 11 trustee. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104-1106
(1982) (discussing appointment and functions of Chapter 11 trustee); 1978 HousE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 220-24 (providing general description of Chapter 11 reorganizations).
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129 (1982) (discussing requirements of court-approved plan).
The purpose of a Chapter 11 reorganization is to allow a debtor to attempt to restructure the
finances of a business so that the business may continue to operate, to provide its employees
with jobs, to pay its creditors and to produce a return for its stockholders. 1978 HousE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 220. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets used for
production in the industry for which the assets were designed are more valuable than the same
assets sold for scrap if the debtor cannot reorganize. 1978 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at
220. To facilitate the purpose of Chapter 11 of the Code, § 1121 of the Code provides that
upon the filing of a petition for relief under Chapter 11, a debtor may file a plan of
reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982) (Chapter 11 debtor has exclusive right to file plan of
reorganization for 120 days after filing for bankruptcy). The purpose of a plan of reorganization
is to determine the amount creditors will be paid, in what form the business will continue and
whether the stockholders will continue to retain any interest in the company. 1978 HousE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 221; see 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1982) (contents of plan of reorganization).
After formulating a plan, the debtor submits the plan to all affected creditors and stockholders
for consent. 1978 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 221; see 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1982) (provisions
for acceptance of plan of reorganization). If a certain percentage of affected creditors and
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on section 362 of the Code, which, upon a debtor's filing of a petition in
bankruptcy, automatically stays most creditor collection activities against
the debtor and the debtor's property.5 The automatic stay imposed by
section 362 of the Code facilitates reorganization by preventing creditors
from depleting the debtor's assets and thus frustrating the debtor's attempt
to reorganize.6 In addition, the automatic stay provision ensures the equitable
treatment of creditors by preventing individual creditors from obtaining
judgments against the debtor that would deplete the amount of assets
available to satisfy other creditor's claims.'
Although section 362 of the Code stays most creditor actions to obtain a
judgment against a Title 11 debtor, courts generally do not extend the
application of the stay to co-defendants of the debtor.' However, when a
judgment against a co-defendant of a debtor adversely would affect the
debtor, courts may extend the application of the automatic stay to actions
against the co-defendant. 9 In addition to the provisions of section 362 of the

stockholders accept the plan, the court then holds a confirmation hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 1126
(1982) (providing criteria for acceptance of chapter I1 plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1128 (1982) (providing
for confirmation hearing on acceptance of chapter 11 plan). Upon confirmation of a plan,
the Code provides that the debtor generally is discharged from any debts that arose prior to
the date of confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1982) (effect of confirmation).
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (automatic stay provision of Code). The purpose of the
automatic stay imposed by § 362 of the Code is to insulate the debtor from the pressure of
creditors who attempt to enforce their claims against the debtor, and to enable the debtor to
formulate a feasible payment plan. See id. (same); 2 L. KNO, COLLMR ON BANKRUPTCY §
362.01, at 362-6 (15th ed. 1979) (§ 362 designed to stay actions against debtor); 1978 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 54-55 (purpose of automatic stay is to provide debtor relief from
creditors). Although the automatic stay provision protects a debtor, the automatic stay also
protects unsecured creditors because the stay prevents a race to the courthouse among creditors
in order to obtain a judgment against a debtor. 1978 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 174.
Accordingly, the automatic stay facilitates a Chapter 11 reorganization that protects the debtor's
assets and provides equal treatment among the debtor's creditors. See id.
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (automatic stay provision of Code prevents creditors
from depleting debtor's assets); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing debtor
protection afforded by automatic stay).
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (automatic stay provision of Code promotes equitable
treatment of creditors); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing creditor
protection afforded by automatic stay). The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code
is not the only Code provision that serves to protect creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982)
(equitable treatment of creditors underlies Code's preference procedure); 11 U.S.C. § 507
(1982) (equitable treatment of creditors underlies Code's priority procedure).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (automatic stay provision of Code is a debtor protection);
1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 54 (automatic stay is fundamental debtor protection);
see also Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., 715 F.2d 124, 126 (4th Cir. 1983) (refusing to
extend automatic stay to co-defendants of a Title 11 debtor); Royal Truck & Trailer, Inc. v.
Armadora Maritima Salvadore, 10 Bankr. 488, 490-91 ( N.D. Ill. 1981) (automatic stay
provision of Code is debtor protection and does not extend to co-defendants of Title 11
debtor).
9. See, e.g., Seybolt v. Bio-Energy of Lincoln, Inc., 38 Bankr. 123, 127-28 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1984) (extending § 362(a)(1) to non-debtor guarantors of Chapter 11 debtor's loan); In
re Metal Center, Inc., 31 Bankr. 458, 463 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (denying extension of §
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Code, which stay most creditor collection activities, section 502(c) of the
Code also attempts to facilitate the efficient rehabilitation of a Title I1debtor
by imposing on the court overseeing the bankruptcy a duty to estimate
contingent or unliquidated claims against the debtor.' 0 Section 502(c) of the
Code applies, for example, when a corporation that has filed for relief under
Chapter 11 of the Code is involved in extensive personal injury and wrongful
death litigation, and the amount of the tort claims against the corporation is
uncertain." Furthermore, a Title 11 debtor may be exposed not only to
extensive litigation, but also to widespread litigation involving contingent or
unliquidated claims. 12 Accordingly, when a Chapter 11 debtor faces extensive
and widespread tort litigation involving co-defendants, the court overseeing
the bankruptcy proceeding must determine whether to extend the automatic
stay to co-defendants of the debtor and whether centralization of the tort
claims in a single forum is necessary to estimate the tort claims to effectuate
the congressional policy of fast and efficient reorganization. 3 In A.H. Robins
Co. v. Piccinin, 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered whether a court may extend the automatic stay imposed by section

362(a)(1) to co-defendants of debtor); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 405, 413 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983) (recognizing § 362(a)(l) could apply to co-defendants of Chapter 11 debtor),
aff'd, 40 Bankr. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In Seybolt v. Bio-Energy of Lincoln, Inc., the bankruptcy
court considered whether §362(a)(1) of the Code stayed a creditors' action against guarantors
of a chapter 11 debtors' obligation to repay a loan. Seybolt, 38 Bankr. at 124. In Seybolt,
the president of Bio-Energy of Lincoln, Inc. (Bio-Energy), prior to the filing of Bio-Energy's
petition in bankruptcy, signed a promissory note for a $100,000 loan made to the company.
Id. Several individuals guaranteed the loan. Id. Subsequently, Bio-Energy filed a petition under
Chapter 11 of the Code and Seybolt instituted an action against the guarantors of the loan.
Id. The Seybolt court recognized that when a debtor and non-debtor were so bound by statute
or contract that the non-debtor's liability is imputed to the debtor, then § 362(a)(1) of the
Code operates to stay actions against the non-debtor. Id. at 127-28. Recognizing that the
guarantor's liability for the $100,000 loan would be imputed to the debtor, Bio-Energy, the
Seybolt court extended the stay of § 362(a)(1) to the non-debtor guarantor of the loan. Id. at
128; see also infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (discussion of Manville).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982) (bankruptcy court estimates contingent or unliquidated
claims for allowance purposes). Section 502(c) of the Code permits the bankruptcy court to
estimate the value of any contingent or unliquidated claim when a determination of the actual
value of the claim would unduly delay the administration of the bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(c) (1982); see also Edwards Co. v. Long Island Trust Co., 75 Misc. 2d 739, 742, 347
N.Y.S.2d 898, 902 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1973). In Edwards Co. v. Long Island Trust Co., the court
recognized that contingent claims include "all debts that, either as to their existence or as to
their amount, depend upon some future event uncertain either as to its occurrence altogether
or as to the time of the occurrence. Id. at 742, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (citing Collier on
Bankruptcy).
1I. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982).
12. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (defining contingent or unliquidated claims).
13. 1978 House REPoRT, supra note 2, at 5. Congress intended the 1978 Bankruptcy
Amendments to provide a quicker, more efficient reorganization procedure, providing greater
protection for debtors, creditors and the public interest. Id. Placing a value on extensive and
widespread tort claims can impede Congress' goal of fast and efficient reorganization and,
therefore, centralization of the tort claims may be necessary. Id.
14. 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986).
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362 of the Code to co-defendants of a Chapter 11 debtor and whether a
court sitting in bankruptcy validly may fix the venue and centralize pending
and possible future tort claims against the debtor.' 5
In Robins, the A.H. Robins Company (Robins), faced with approximately 5,000 pending personal injury and wrongful death claims arising
from use of the Dalkon Shield, 16 filed a petition for relief under Chapter
11 of the Code. 17 Upon the filing of the Chapter 11 petition, section 362
of the Code automatically stayed the commencement or continuation of all
suits against Robins. 8 A number of plaintiffs with pending tort actions
naming Robins and at least one other defendant, however, attempted to
sever the actions against Robins and proceed solely against the co-defendants.' 9 Robins responded by petitioning the court to declare that Robins'
products liability policy with Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna)
constituted an asset of Robins' bankrupt estate, in which all Dalkon Shield
plaintiffs and claimants had an interest and therefore was protected by the
stay imposed by section 362(a)(3) of the Code. 20 In addition, Robins moved
2
for an injunction to stay actions against the co-defendants. '
The district court, in a hearing on Robins' request for injunctive relief,
found that allowing litigation to continue in the tort actions against Robins'

15. Id. at 998-1016.
16. See id. at 996. In 1970, the A.H. Robins Company (Robins) acquired the patent
and marketing rights to an intrauterine contraceptive device known as the Dalkon Shield (the
"Shield"). Id. The Dalkon Shield itself is a plastic device that looks like a crab, "with five
'fins' of varying sizes protruding from either side to make expulsion from the uterus difficult."
ENGELMAYER & WAGMAN, LoRD's JusncE 18 (1985). A nylon tailstring is attached to the
device as a marker to determine if the Shield is in place. Id. The Dalkon Shield allegedly
caused Pelvic Inflammatory Disease (PID). Id. at 11. PID refers to a variety of pelvic infections
attacking the uterus, fallopian tubes or ovaries. Id. Robins manufactured and marketed the
shield from 1971 until 1974, at which time the company discontinued the manufacture and
sale of the Shield because of complaints and suits alleging injury from use of the device.
Robins, 788 F.2d at 996. Robins did not recall the Shield until 1984. Id. By mid-1985, Robins
and the company's insurer, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna), had paid approximately $517 million for 25 trial judgments and 9,300 settlements. Id. at 996 n.4.
17. In re A.H. Robins Co., No. 85-01307-R (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed August 21, 1985);
supra note 16 (discussing circumstances leading to Robins' bankruptcy).
18. Robins, 788 F.2d at 996; see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (automatic stay applies upon
debtor's filing of bankruptcy petition under Code); supra note 5 and accompanying text
(discussing automatic stay).
19. Robins, 788 F.2d at 996. More than half of the 5,000 pending tort claims named
Robins as the sole defendant, with the remaining claims naming at least one defendant other
than Robins. Id.
20. Id. at 996-97. The filing of a bankruptcy petition under the Bankruptcy Code creates
an estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982). Section 541(a)(1) of the Code defines property of the
estate, in part, as "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case." Id. § 541(a)(1). Section 362(a)(3) of the Code stays actions by creditor of bankruptcy
debtors to obtain possession or exercise control over property of the debtor's estate as defined
in § 541(a)(1). Id. § 362(a)(3). Accordingly, if the A.H. Robins Company's liability policy was
property of Robins bankrupt estate, § 362(a)(3) of the Code would operate to stay any proceeding
that potentially could deplete the proceeds of the policy. See id.
21. Robins, 788 F.2d at 997.
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co-defendants threatened the property in the Robins' estate, impeded Robins'
reorganization effort, contravened public interest, and rendered any plan of
reorganization futile. 22 The district judge further found that the burden
placed on the Robins' estate by continuation of the tort litigation outweighed
the potential harm to the Dalkon Shield claimants that would result from
the issuance of an injunction staying the litigation.? Therefore, relying on
section 362(a)(1) of the Code, the district court enjoined further litigation
in the eight tort actions against Robins' co-defendants. 24 In addition, the
district court found that the proceeds of Robins' liability policy with Aetna
5
constituted property of the Robins' estate?2
Recognizing that the Robins'
policy with Aetna constituted property of Robins' estate, the district court,
pursuant to section 362(a)(3) of the Code, stayed damage actions against
Robins or Robins' co-defendants that potentially could be satisfied from
proceeds of the Aetna policy. 26 Three defendants, including Anna Piccinin,
appealed the district court's decision to grant injunctive relief to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.27
Three weeks after entry of the preliminary injunction staying further
litigation against Robins' co-defendants, Robins moved for a determination
in the district court of the trial venue of all Dalkon Shield suits.? After

22. Id.
23. Id. The district court in A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin applied the preliminary
injunction test set forth in Blackwelder Furniturev. Seilig Manufacturing Company to determine
whether to grant Robins petition for injunctive relief. Id. at 1008; see Blackwelder Furniture
Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 195 (4th Cir. 1977) (fourth circuit's preliminary
injunction test). The Blackwelder court held that the propriety of issuing an injunction is
determined by balancing the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if an injunction is
denied compared to the harm to the defendant if an injunction is issued. Blackwelder, 550
F.2d at 195. Following the Blackwelder test, the district court in Robins found that Robins
would suffer irreparable harm from continuation of the actions against its co-defendants, the
likelihood of Robins' successful reorganization was indisputable, and the public interest in an
effective reorganization of Robins outweighed any hardship to the claimants. Robins, 788 F.2d
at 1008. Accordingly, the district court granted the injunctive relief, staying all actions against
Robins co-defendants. Id. The Fourth Circuit later examined the district court's test for
determining the circumstances in which injunctive relief is appropriate and agreed with the
district court's finding that absent injunctive relief, Robins faced irreparable harm through
diminution of its insurance pool. Id. The Fourth Circuit also agreed with the district court
that Robins had a high likelihood of a successful reorganization. Id. Moreover, the Fourth
Circuit found, as had the district court, that the balance of hardships favored the issuance of
an injunction, and that Robins' effective reorganization served the public interest. Id. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit sustained the district court's decision to enjoin actions against Robins'
co-defendants. Id.
24. Robins, 788 F.2d at 997; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982) (automatic stay provision).
25. Robins, 788 F.2d at 997; see supra note 20 (explaining significance of finding that
liability policy constitutes property of debtor's estate).
26. Robins, 788 F.2d at 997; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1982); supra note 20 and
accompanying text (discussing application of § 362(a)(3) of the Code to stay actions against
property of debtors' bankrupt estate).
27. Robins, 788 F.2d at 997.
28. Id. In addition to seeking a determination of trial venue, the A.H. Robins Company
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hearing the motions, the district judge found that all tort actions arising
from use of the Dalkon Shield were proceedings related to the Chapter 11
case and, therefore, concluded that the district court possessed jurisdiction
over the proceedings. 29 Accordingly, the district court set the trial venue of

the tort actions in the Richmond Division of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.30 The district court further ordered
the transfer to the Richmond Division of actions "related to" the Robins
Chapter 11 case pending in federal district court during the disposition of

the Chapter 11 case. 31 Anna Piccinin appealed the district court's order to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit22
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit first addressed the propriety of the district

court's decision to enjoin or stay actions against the co-defendants of
Robins. 3 The Fourth Circuit recognized that the automatic stay imposed
by section 362(a)(1) of the Code generally stays actions against the debtor

only.3 4 The Fourth Circuit explained, however, that unusual circumstances

may permit a bankruptcy court to stay proceedings against co-defendants
of a Title 11 debtor pursuant to section 362(a)(1). 5 The Robins court
suggested that section 362(a)(1) applies to a co-defendant of a Title 11 debtor
when a judgment against a co-defendant effectively would operate as a
judgment against the debtor.3

6

The Robins court noted, for example, that

when a co-defendant of a Title 11 debtor is entitled to absolute indemnity

also moved for identification of Dalkon Shield tort cases "related to" Robins' Chapter 11
case and a transfer of the "related to" cases to the Eastern District of Virginia for trial. Id.
The importance to Robins of determining which tort cases were "related to" the bankruptcy
case is that the district court sitting in bankruptcy possesses jurisdiction over "related to"
cases and, therefore, can transfer the venue of "related to" cases to the district court sitting
in bankruptcy. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining "related to" jurisdiction
of district court sitting in bankruptcy).
29. Robins, 788 F.2d at 998; see 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982) (jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts). Section 1334(a) of title 28 of the United States Code, defining the jurisdiction of the
district courts over bankruptcy proceedings, provides in part that the United States District
Courts possess non-exclusive jurisdiction over civil proceedings "related to" cases under the
Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982) (jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts); see 1 L. KING, COLLMER ON
BArictrurcy § 3.01, at 3-25 (15th ed. 1974) (defining proceedings related to cases under Title
11). One commentator has suggested that as a guideline, "related to" proceedings include suits
between third parties that affect the administration of the Title II case. I L. KiNa, supra, §
3.01 at 3-25. In the Robins case, if the Dalkon Shield claims are "related to" Robins' Chapter
11 case, the district court sitting in bankruptcy would possess jurisdiction to transfer the
actions from the district in which the claims were originally filed to the district where the
bankruptcy is pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982) (permitting district court to change venue).
30. Robins, 788 F.2d at 998.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 999; see supranote 8 and accompanying text (courts generally extend protection
of § 362(a)(1) to debtors only).
35. Robins, 788 F.2d at 999; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (courts in unusual
circumstances may apply § 362(a)(1) of Code to non-debtors).
36. Robins, 788 F.2d at 999.
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from the debtor for any judgment against the co-defendant, the debtor
ultimately will pay any judgments against the co-defendant. 37 Accordingly,
the Robins court found that extension of the automatic stay to a codefendant entitled to absolute indemnity is necessary to effectuate the
purpose and intent of section 362(a)(1) of the Code to protect the assets of
the debtor's estate. 3 Conversely, the Fourth Circuit recognized that when
a third-party defendant independently is liable, such as when a debtor and
another party are joint tortfeasors, section 362(a)(1) should apply to the
39

debtor only.

In addition to recognizing section 362(a)(1) of the Code as valid authority
to stay actions against co-defendants of a debtor, the Fourth Circuit also
recognized that section 362(a)(3) of the Code operates to stay any action to
obtain possession or exercise control over a Title 11 debtor's property. 40
The Fourth Circuit explained that the property of a Title 11 debtor's estate
includes all legal or equitable interests in property that a debtor possesses
upon commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. 4' The Robins court then
found that Robins' liability policy with Aetna constituted a valuable asset
of the Robins bankrupt estate and properly fit within the statutory definition

37. Id.
38. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), 362(a)(3) (1982) (providing for stay of actions against
debtor and property of debtors estate upon filing of bankruptcy petition); see also supra note
5 and accompanying text (purpose of § 362(a) of Code generally is to provide debtor fresh
start free from creditor harassment).
39. Robins, 788 F.2d at 999. In A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, the Fourth Circuit
principally relied on two cases to support the position that courts do not extend § 362(a)(1)
of the Bankruptcy Code to actions against co-defendants of a debtor when the co-defendant
and the debtor are independently liable. Id. at 999-1000; see Seybolt v. Bio-Energy of Lincoln,
38 Bankr. 123, 128 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (extending § 362(a)(1) to non-debtor guarantors
of Chapter 11 debtor's loan); In re Metal Center, 31 Bankr. 458, 463 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983)
(denying extension of section 362(a)(1) to co-defendants of debtor); supra note 9 (discussion
of Seybolt). In In re Metal Center, the court considered whether to extend the stay imposed
by § 362(a)(1) of the Code to a co-defendant of a Chapter 11 debtor. Metal Center, 31 Bankr.
at 462. In Metal Center, Plessey Precision Metals (Plessey) sold goods to the Metal Center on
an open account with a third-party guaranteeing payment of all indebtedness that the Metal
Center incurred. Id. at 459. Subsequently, the Metal Center filed a petition under Chapter 11
of the Code and Plessey instituted suit against the Metal Center and the third-party guarantor.
Id. The Metal Center court recognized that § 362(a)(1) generally applies to debtors, but
acknowledged that if a debtor and non-debtor are so bound by statute or contract that the
liability of the non-debtor is imputed to the debtor, then § 362(a)(l) should apply to the nondebtor. Id. at 462. Finding, however, that Metal Center would not be bound by any judgments
against the third-party guarantor, the Metal Center court refused to extend the stay of §
362(a)(1) of the Code to the third party guarantor. Id. at 403; see In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
26 Bankr. 405, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (§ 362(a)(1) of Code applies only to debtor when debtor
and non-debtor are joint tortfeasors).
40. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1982) (automatic stay extends
to debtor's property); supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing § 362(a)(3) of Code).
41. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001; see supra note 20 and accompanying text (property of
debtor's estate includes all debtor's legal or equitable interests in property at commencement
of bankruptcy case).
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of property. 42 Accordingly, the Robins court held that because the Aetna

policy constituted property of Robins' estate, section 362(a)(3) of the Code
applied to stay all actions against Aetna or against any officers or employees
of Robins entitled to indemnification under the Aetna policy. 43 In addition
to recognizing the statutory power afforded courts in sections 362(a)(1) and
362(a)(3) of the Code to stay actions against co-defendants of a Title 11
debtor, the Fourth Circuit found that section 105 of the Code, in certain
circumstances, empowers a bankruptcy court to enjoin actions against codefendants. 44 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that bankruptcy courts
possess inherent power as courts of equity to grant a stay applicable to co45
defendants of a debtor.

After sustaining the district court's decision to stay actions against
Robins' co-defendants, the Fourth Circuit considered the validity of the
district court's order fixing the trial venue for all Dalkon Shield cases in
and providing for the transfer of the cases to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 46 The Fourth Circuit first rec-

ognized that section 157(b)(5) of title 28 of the United States Code grants
to a district court the power to fix the trial venue for personal injury and
wrongful death tort actions against a Title 11 debtor.41 Although the

42. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001; see In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 184 (5th Cir. 1984)
(insurance contracts constitute property of estate under § 541(a)(1) of Code); supra note 25
(discussing insurance policy as property of bankrupt estate).
43. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001-02.
44. Id. at 1002; see 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982) (district court sitting in bankruptcy possesses
power to enjoin actions to carry out purposes of Title 11); The Fourth Circuit, relying on In
re Otero Mills, recognized that the bankruptcy court should exercise the power afforded by §
105 only when failure to enjoin a suit against co-defendant of a debtor adversely would affect
the debtor's estate or hinder the debtor's ability to formulate a Chapter 11 plan. Robins, 788
F.2d at 1003; see also In re Otero Mills, Inc., 25 Bankr. 1018, 1020 (N.M. 1982); infra notes
95-100 and accompanying text (complete discussion of Otero Mills decision).
45. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1003. In A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, the Fourth Circuit
recognized that § 1334 of title 28 of the United States Code confers upon the bankruptcy
court inherent power to grant a stay under its general equity power and in the efficient
management of the court's dockets. Id; 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982). In order to grant a stay
under the court's inherent power, the Fourth Circuit noted that a bankruptcy court must weigh
competing interests and justify the stay by clear and convincing circumstances. Robins, 788
F.2d at 1003.
46. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1009. Before turning to the merits of the district court's order,
the Fourth Circuit disposed of Robins' contention that the district court's order fixing the
venue in Richmond was not subject to appeal. Id. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that §
1291 of title 28 of the United States Code limits an appellate court's jurisdiction to appeals
from final decisions of the district courts. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (final decisions of
district courts). The Fourth Circuit explained, however, that any dispute between a debtor and
creditor is a distinct and separate proceeding from the overall bankruptcy case. Robins, 788
F.2d at 1009. The Fourth Circuit recognized, therefore, that an order settling a dispute between
a debtor and a creditor such as a dispute over the venue for trial of the Dalkon Shield claims
constitutes a final and appealable order. Id.; see In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 441
(st Cir. 1983) (order settling dispute between bankrupt and creditors is appealable).
47. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1009-10; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1982) (district court sitting
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appellants argued that Congress intended that courts apply section 157(b)(5)
to decentralize the trial of tort claims and to permit trials to proceed in the
district in which the claim originally was filed, the Fourth Circuit found
that section 157(b)(5) contemplates the centralization of tort claims in a
single forum to facilitate debtor reorganization. 4s Recognizing that section

157(b)(5) empowers a district court to fix the trial venue for tort actions
against a Title 11 debtor, the Fourth Circuit next considered the procedure
for exercising the power. 49 The appellants argued that under section 1412
of title 28 of the United States Code, the authority to transfer a suit against
50
a Title 11 debtor rests solely with the court in which the suit is pending.
The Robins court explained, however, that section 1412 provides a general

rule, while section 157(b)(5) specifically addresses the power of a district
court to fix venue in a tort claim against a Title 11 debtor.51 The Robins
in bankruptcy sets trial venue for tort claims against Title 11 debtor). Section 157(b)(5) of title
28 states:
The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims
shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the
district court in the district in which the claim arose, as determined by the district
court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.
Id.
48. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1010. In A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, the appellants relied on
the remarks of Senator Dole, in commenting on the Senate Conference Report on the 1984
Bankruptcy Amendments, to support their belief that § 157(b)(5) contemplated decentralization
of the trial of tort claims. Id.; see 130 CONG. REc. S. 8889 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks
of Senator Dole) [hereinafter 1984 SENATE DEBATE] reprinted in, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMN. NEws 586, 587. Senator Dole, in his remarks on the Conference Report, simply stated
that personal injury cases will be handled by the district court "where the bankruptcy case
has been filed, or if that court finds it appropriate, where the claim arose." SENATE DEBATE,
supra, at 8890. The Fourth Circuit found nothing in Senator Dole's comments, however, to
suggest that Congress favored decentralization of the trial of tort claims against a debtor.
Robins, 788 F.2d at 1010. The Fourth Circuit, conversely, noted that Congress feared that
decentralizing the trial of tort claims against a Title II debtor might dissipate the assets of the
debtor's estate by creating a multiplicity of forums for the separate adjudication of individual
creditors' claims within the bankruptcy case. Id.; see also 130 CONG. REc. H7492 (daily ed.
June 29, 1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEWS at 579. In Robins, the
Fourth Circuit also rejected the appellant's reliance on In re White Motor Credit as support
for the proposition that § 157(b)(5) of title 28 contemplates decentralization of the trial of
tort claims against a Title I1 debtor. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1010; see In re White Motor Credit,
761 F.2d 270, 273-74 (6th Cir. 1985). The White Motor court found that judicial economy in
a large products liability case sometimes may require the bankruptcy court to abstain, allowing
the state court to handle the tort case. White Motor, 761 F.2d at 274. The Fourth Circuit
found that although the White Motor court permitted decentralization of the trial of tort
claims against a debtor, the White Motor opinion did not suggest that decentralization was
mandated or preferred. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1010.
49. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1010-11; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 1985) (procedures for
personal injury bankruptcy cases).
50. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1011; see 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp. 1985) (district court may
transfer Title 11 case to another district in interest of justice and for convenience of parties).
51. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1011; see 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp. 1985) (change of venue
provision); 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 1985) (procedures for personal injury bankruptcy
cases); supra note 47 and accompanying text (section 157(b)(5) expressly governs jurisdiction
of personal injury and wrongful death claims against Title 11 debtor).
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court found, therefore, that section 157(b)(5) governed the pending tort
claims against Robins and authorized the district court sitting in bankruptcy
to transfer the venue of the claims to a single forum. 2
After concluding that section 157(b)(5) authorizes a district court to
centralize personal injury tort claims against a Title 11 debtor, the Fourth
Circuit found that certain provisions of the Code necessitated centralization
of the tort claims against Robins. 3 The Robins court explained that the
Dalkon Shield claims represented contingent or unliquidated claims.5 4 The
Robins court recognized that section 502 of the Code generally requires a
bankruptcy court to estimate contingent or unliquidated claims against a
debtor for allowance purposes when failure to estimate the claims would
delay the administration of the bankruptcy proceeding.55 The Fourth Circuit
noted that an exception to the duty imposed by section 502 expressly denies

a bankruptcy court authority to estimate contingent or unliquidated tort
claims for distribution purposes.5 6 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged, however, that the Robins case involved an attempted reorganization, and not a
liquidation proceeding that would require the distribution of a debtor's
assets.57 The Fourth Circuit found, therefore, that section 502(c) of the
Code imposed a duty on the bankruptcy court to estimate the Dalkon Shield

claims against Robins."' Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that the bank-

52. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1011; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 1985) (procedures for
personal injury bankruptcy cases).
53. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1011-14; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 1985) (same).
54. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1011; see supra note 10 and accompanying text (defining
contingent claims).
55. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1011; see 11U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982). The estimation procedure
requires a bankruptcy court to fix the value or dollar amount of those contingent or unliquidated
claims against a Title 11 debtor that unduly would delay administration of the bankrupt estate.
11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 354 (1978)
(section 502(c) of Code requires that bankruptcy court convert claims against debtor to dollar
amount), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADnmN. NEws 6310.
56. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1012; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (Supp. 1985) (procedures for
personal injury bankruptcy cases). Section 157(b)(1) of title 28 of the United States Code
provides, in part, that bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all core proceedings arising
under Title 11, or arising in a case under Title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (Supp. 1985). Section
157(b)(1) further classifies the estimation of claims against a Title 11debtor for purposes of
confirming a plan as a core proceeding that the bankruptcy judge may hear and determine.
Id. Section 157(b)(2)(B) provides, however, that the estimation of contingent or unliquidated
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against a Title I1debtor's estate for purposes of
distribution is not a core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1985). Because estimation
for purposes of distribution is a non-core proceeding, bankruptcy judges may not enter a
determination by order or judgment that affects the dollar amount to be distributed to tort
plaintiffs for their claim. See Taggart, The New Bankruptcy Court System, 59 AM. BAKaR.
L.J. 231, 244 (1985) (discussing non-core proceedings).
57. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1012; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982) (Chapter 7 of Code
governs liquidation proceedings).
58. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1012; see 11U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982) (estimation of contingent or
unliquidated claims required); Taggart, supra note 56, at 251-52. One commentator suggests
that Congress structured bankruptcy procedure to allow bankruptcy courts to estimate contin-
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ruptcy court in Robins could estimate the numerous Dalkon Shield claims

efficiently only if the claims were centralized in a single forum.5 9
Upon establishing the bankruptcy court's power to centralize for estimation purposes the tort claims against Robins, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the centralization and estimation proceedings should precede
the individual trial. 60 The Fourth Circuit explained that allowing the trial
of tort claims to precede the estimation of the claims against a Chapter 11
debtor would divert the debtor's energies from determining the feasibility
of reorganization. 61 The Robins court further recognized that if the trials
of the claims against Robins preceded estimation, the expense of litigation

might deplete the assets of Robins' estate and deny the tort claimants
reasonable compensation. 2 Conversely, the Fourth Circuit found that if the
bankruptcy court fairly estimated the tort claims against Robins, and Robins
developed a plan of reorganization based on the estimation, fair compensation of the tort claimants would be possible without the necessity of
litigation. 63 In addition, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the estimation

procedure provides a more efficient process than individual trials on the
numerous tort claims because the estimation procedure requires the bankruptcy court to examine only enough claims to make an intelligent estimation, rather than an examination of all claims." Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit approved the district court's decision to65 centralize the tort claims
against Robins prior to the trials of the claims.
gent or unliquidated tort claims for purposes of confirming a plan, and not for distribution
purposes, because Congress feared that without a dollar value placed on the contingent or
unliquidated claims, confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan would be delayed. Taggart, supra note
56 at 251-52.
59. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1013-14. The Fourth Circuit explained that centralization of the
claims in a single forum would permit all claimants' interests to be heard and harmonized.
Id.at 1014.
60. Id. at 1012.
61. Id.
62. Id. In Robins v. Piccinin, the Fourth Circuit noted that over 5,000 tort claims
remained pending against Robins at the time Robins filed its petition in bankruptcy. Id. at
1013. The Fourth Circuit relied on In re Johns-Manville in determining that with so many
claims filed against Robins, estimation of the claims should precede any trial of the claims.
Id.; see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 45 Bankr. 823, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The Manville
court considered whether § 157(b)(5) mandated the immediate trial of a plaintiff's tort claims
against a Chapter 11 debtor prior to the estimation process. Manville, 45 Bankr. at 825. In
Manville, subsequent to Manville's filing under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Roberts,
a tort plaintiff, petitioned the court to allow an immediate trial against Manville on Roberts'
tort claim. Id. The Manville court reasoned that ordering the trial of the claims prior to
determining whether trial of all the tort claims against Manville would totally deplete the
debtor's estate and prior to developing a plan of reorganization was improper. Id. at 827.
Accordingly, the Manville court held that § 157(b)(5) does not mandate immediate trial of
tort claims against a Chapter 11 debtor.
63. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1013. The Fourth Circuit recognized that estimation was a
possible step in permitting Robins to arrive at an acceptable settlement with the tort plaintiffs
without resorting to litigation. Id.
64. Id.at 1013.
65. Id.
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Recognizing the authority of the district court sitting in bankruptcy to

centralize in a single forum tort claims against a Chapter 11 debtor, the
Fourth Circuit next examined the procedures for effecting a change of venue
that would satisfy the requirements of due process.66 The Fourth Circuit

agreed with the appellants that a right of action in tort constitutes property,
which under due process cannot be affected adversely by an involuntary

change of venue without notice and an opportunity to object to the venue
change.6 7 The Robins court explained that a tort plaintiff has a right to a
jury trial in a district court, and the forum for that trial is also an important
right entitled to due process protection.68 The Robins court found, however,
that due process is not an inflexible concept, and the requirement of notice
and an opportunity for a hearing does not always apply prior to an initial
deprivation of property.6 9 More specifically the Fourth Circuit explained
that when only property rights are involved, due process does not require
that prior to an initial deprivation of that property right, notice and an
opportunity to be heard be afforded, provided that the opportunity for an
70
adversarial proceeding is provided before the deprivation becomes final.
The Robins court concluded, therefore, that due process requires only that
notice and an opportunity for a hearing be provided to the individual tort
plaintiffs before a transfer of venue to the district where the bankruptcy is
pending becomes final for trial purposes.71 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit

66. Id. at 1014; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process clause).
67. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1014; see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428
(1982) (right of action in tort is subject to due process).
68. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1014; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1982) (tort plaintiff has right
to jury trial in district court). Despite a bankruptcy court's duty to estimate tort claims in a
Chapter 11 reorganization, the Fourth Circuit noted that, pursuant to § 157(b)(5) of title 28
of the United States Code, a tort plaintiff is entitled upon request to a jury trial in a district
court. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1012; see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 1985) (procedure for
personal injury bankruptcy cases); supra note 47 and accompanying text (tort plaintiff entitled
upon request to trial).
69. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1014; see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981) (procedure
giving remedy to plaintiff after deprivation of property sufficient to meet due process requirements); McClelland v. Massinga, 786 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1986) (due process not
mechanical instrument but rather delicate process of adjustment)
70. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1014.
71. Id. In concluding that individual tort plaintiffs are entitled to notice and an opportunity to object prior to a final transfer of venue, the Fourth Circuit in Robins v. Piccinin
relied not only on due process analysis, but also on the Bankruptcy Rules. Id. The Fourth
Circuit explained that Robins' motion to change venue was a "contested matter" that, pursuant
to Bankruptcy Rule 9014, required the giving of reasonable notice and an opportunity for a
hearing to the tort claimants against whom the relief was sought. Id.; see FED. R. BANKR. P.
9014 (rule on contested matters). Bankruptcy Rule 9014 states that in contested matters, a
party requesting relief must file a motion, giving the party against whom relief is sought notice
of the contested matter and an opportunity for a hearing. FED. R. BhcRa. P. 9014; see FED.
R. BANKR. P. 9014 Advisory Committee Note (discussing contested matters). The Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 9014 further explains that when an actual dispute occurs regarding
the bankruptcy case, other than an adversary proceeding, the litigation to resolve the dispute
before the bankruptcy court constitutes a "contested matter." FED. R. BcacR. P. 9014
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held that due process did not require Robins to afford the individual tort
plaintiff notice and an opportunity to object and be heard prior to the
conditional transfer of venue of the tort claims for estimation purposes.72
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit properly
extended the automatic stay to co-defendants of Robins under any of the
four grounds on which the Fourth Circuit relied. 73 The Fourth Circuit first
found that section 362(a)(1) of the Code provided statutory authority to
extend the stay to the co-defendants of Robins. 74 The automatic stay that
section 362(a)(l) imposes is designed to protect a debtor against most creditor
collection activities upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.7 5 Extension of
the stay to a co-defendant of a Title 11 debtor pursuant to section 362(a)(1)
fulfills the express purpose of the stay when the co-defendant is related so
closely to the debtor that a judgment against the co-defendant, in effect,
would act as a judgment against the debtor.7 6 More specifically, when a
debtor is obligated to indemnify a co-defendant, as in Robins, the debtor
77
ultimately will pay for any trial judgments against the co-defendant.

Advisory Committee Note. The Robins court noted that although the debtor gave notice to
the Dalkon Shield Claimants Committee (the "Committee"), notice to the Committee did not
constitute service on the individual tort plaintiffs as recuired by Bankruptcy Rule 9014 prior
to a final transfer of venue, but possibly satisfied the due process requirements for a conditional
transfer of venue to estimate the tort claims. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1015. Additionally, the
Fourth Circuit recognized that the individual claimants, in addition to being entitled to receive
notice, deserved an opportunity to object prior to the final venue change. Id. The Fourth
Circuit explained that when a tort claimant objects to the final transfer of venue, the district
court in which the bankruptcy case is pending must balance the advantages and disadvantages
of transferring the claimants' case to the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.
Id. at 1016. The Fourth Circuit noted several factors for the district court to consider in
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of transferring the Dalkon Shield claims to
Richmond. Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that some cases might be prepared and ready for
state trial, some might require substantial numbers of local witnesses, and some claimants
might be receiving critical medical, physical or psychological care in a local area. Id. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit recognized that issues of state law might affect substantially the
results in individual cases. Id.
72. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1016.
73. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's extension
of automatic stay in Robins).
74. Robins, 788 F.2d at 999; see supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing
Fourth Circuit's extension of § 362(a)) to Robins' co-defendants); see also 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(l) (1982) (automatic stay).
75. U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982); supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing attributes
of automatic stay).
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(l) (1982) (automatic stay); supra note 5 and accompanying
text (purposes of automatic stay include protection of debtor against creditor collection
activities).
77. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1007. In Robins v. Piccinin, all co-defendants were entitled
to indemnification from Robins. Id. Dr. Clark and the two Robins were entitled to indemnification from Robins under Robins' corporate by-laws and the statutes of Virginia, which is
the state of Robins' incorporation. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3 (1984) (corporation in
Virginia empowered to provide indemnity for officers or directors). Another co-defendant of
Robins, Dr. Davis, was the beneficiary of an express contract of indemnification with Robins.
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Accordingly, when a co-defendant is entitled to indemnification from a Title
11 debtor, courts properly should extend the automatic stay to suits against
the co-defendant to protect the debtor from the wrath of creditor claims
7
through indemnification. 1
Although section 362(a)(1) of the Code provides valid authority to stay
actions against a debtor's co-defendants, the Fourth Circuit correctly held
that section 362(a)(3) of the Code also authorized the district court to extend
the stay to the co-defendants of Robins. 79 Section 362(a)(3) stays actions by
creditors of a bankrupt debtor to obtain possession of or to exercise control
over property of the debtor's estate.? Section 541(a)(l) of the Code, with
limited exceptions, defines property of a Chapter 11 debtor's estate to
include all legal or equitable interests in property that a debtor possesses at

Robins, 788 F.2d at 1007. Yet another co-defendant of Robins, Aetna, was not entitled to
indemnity from Robins, but was Robins' invader against judgments in favor of indemnitees.
Id. at 1007-08.
78. See I1 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (automatic stay provision of Code). In addition to
promoting the purpose of the automatic stay, the Fourth Circuit's extension of the automatic
stay to non-debtor co-defendants is consistent with other judicial interpretations that section
362(a)(1) can apply to nondebtors. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 405 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 40 Bankr. 219 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Royal Truck & Trailer v.
Armadora Maritima Salvadore, 10 Bankr. 488, 491 (N.D. 111.1981). In Royal Truck & Trailer
v. Armadora Maritima Salvadore, the court considered whether to extend the stay imposed
by section 362(a)(1) of the Code to co-defendants of a Chapter 11 debtor. Royal Truck, 10
Bankr. at 488. In Royal Truck, the plaintiff, Royal Truck, leased fifty refrigerator trailers to
Armadora Maritima Salvadore (Armasal) with Viterwyk Corporation (Viterwyk) acting as
guarantor of Armasas obligation. Id. Subsequently, Armasal stopped rental payments on the
trailers and ultimately filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Code. Id. Royal Truck instituted
an action against Viterwyk as guarantor, and Viterwyk sought protection under the automatic
stay of § 362(a)(1) of the Code. Id. The Royal Truck court characterized § 362(a)(1) as a
fundamental debtor protection and refused to extend the stay to Viterwyk. Id. The Royal
Truck court, however, expressly recognized that in certain circumstances section 362(a)(1) could
apply to non-debtors. Id. at 491. Accordingly, the Royal Truck decision left the door open
for situations such as the Robins case. Id. Additionally, after the Royal Truck decision, the
court in In re Johns-Manville considered whether to extend the stay imposed by section 362(a)(1)
of the Code to co-defendants of a Chapter 11 debtor. Manville, 26 Bankr. at 405. The
Manville court held that section 362(a)(1) of the Code applies to co-defendants of a Title 11
debtor when the debtor and defendants are "inextricably interwoven." Id. at 413. Some
ambiguity exists as to whether the Manville court intended that the inextricable intertwining
be in the nature of common questions of law and fact between the debtor and co-defendant,
or whether the term referred to the sharing of liability between the debtor and co-defendant.
Id. If "inextricable intertwining" did refer to liability, then in the Robins case, the fact that
Robins and its co-defendants are not joint-tortfeasors with independent liability but rather
have indemnification relationships suggests that Robins and its co-defendants are "inextricably
intertwined." See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1007 (discussing relationship between Robins and codefendants). Accordingly, under the Manville reasoning, section 362(a)(1) of the Code would
operate to stay actions against Robins' co-defendants. Manville, 26 Bankr. at 405.
79. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001 (finding § 362(a)(3) allowed extension of stay to codefendants); 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1982); see also supra note 20
and accompanying text (discussing § 362(a)(3) of Bankruptcy Code).
80. See 11U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1982) (providing stay against creditor actions to obtain
possession or exercise control over property of debtor's estate); see also 2 L. KiNo, supra note
5, at 362-34 (same); 1978 Housa REPORT, supra note 2, at 341 (same).
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the time of the debtor's commencement of a Chapter 11 case. 1 The federal
courts agree that insurance policies of a debtor constitute property of the

estate under section 541(a)(1) and, therefore, the courts have found that
section 362(a)(3) operates to stay any action that could deplete the proceeds

of a debtor's insurance policy. 2 For example, in In re Johns-Manville
Corp.,8 the bankruptcy court considered whether section 362(a)(3) of the
Code stayed actions against a Chapter 11 debtor's insurance carriers. 84 In
Manville, the court recognized that the expansive scope of the definition of
property in section 541 encompasses the insurance proceeds of a Title 11
debtor. 85 The Manville court, therefore, held that section 362(a)(3) properly

stayed actions against a Chapter 11 debtor's insurance carriers.

6

Applying

the principle of Manville to the Robins case suggests that actions against

Robins' co-defendant insurance company, Aetna, and actions depleting
Robins' insurance policy properly were stayed.8 Robins' liability policy with
Aetna is certainly a valuable asset of the Robins estate because the proceeds

of the policy potentially can compensate the Dalkon Shield claimants."8
Allowing the continuation or commencement of actions against Aetna or
actions against Robins co-defendants entitled to indemnification under the
policy, would diminish a source of funds to Robins for the payment of the

Dalkon Shield claimants. 9 Accordingly, extension of the stay to Robins codefendants pursuant to section 362(a)(3) of the Code is proper not only
under the Manville reasoning, but also in light of the policy behind the
automatic stay of protecting the assets of the debtor's estate. 9°

81. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982); see supra note 20 and accompanying text (§ 541 creates
an estate upon filing of petition and defines the estate).
82. See II U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982) (§ 541 creates an estate upon filing of petition); 11
U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1982) (stays actions against debtors estate); see also In re Pearlwick Corp.,
15 Bankr. 143, 148 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (life insurance policy naming Chapter 11 debtor
as beneficiary constituted property of debtor's estate), aff'd, 26 Bankr. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
aff'd, 697 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Moskowitz, 13 Bankr. 357, 358-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981) (debtor's medical insurance policy constituted property of debtor's estate); In re Norman
Indus., Inc., I Bankr. 162, 167 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1979) (debtor's insurance policy constituted
property of debtor's estate).
83. 40 Bankr. 219, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
84. Id. at 229. In In re Johns-Manville Corp., GAF Corporation (GAF), a co-defendant
of Manville, appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to stay third-party actions against
Manville's insurance carriers. Id. GAF argued that § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code operates to
stay proceedings against a debtor and the debtor's property, but does not cover claims against
the debtor's insurers. Id. at 230. The Manville court recognized that OAF, in essence, argued
that a debtor's insurance policy is not property of the debtor's estate under § 541 of the Code
and therefore, is not subject to the stay that § 362(a)(3) of the Code imposes. Id.
85. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982) (property of debtor's estate).
86. Manville, 40 Bankr. at 229; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1982) (automatic stay protecting
property of debtor's estate).
87. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001 (describing actions depleting Robin's insurance policy);
supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing Manville decision).
88. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1008 (explaining Robin's insurance policy with Aetna).
89. Id.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1982); supra note 5 and accompanying text (policy of automatic
stay is to protect debtor's assets).
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In addition to the Fourth Circuit's determination in Robins that sections
362(a)(I) and 362(a)(3) of the Code support extension of the stay to co-

defendants of a Chapter 11 debtor, the Fourth Circuit correctly recognized
that section 105 of the Code, in proper circumstances, authorizes extension

of the stay to co-defendants. 91 Section 105 of the Code, in part, empowers
a district court sitting in bankruptcy to enjoin a proceeding, such as a tort
action against a co-defendant of a debtor, if the bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction over the proceeding.92 A bankruptcy court possesses sufficient

jurisdiction to enjoin a proceeding if the proceeding is "related to" the
Chapter 11 case. 93 A proceeding is "related to" the bankruptcy case when

failure to enjoin pursuant to section 105 of the Code would adversely affect
the bankruptcy estate and would detrimentally influence the debtor through

the co-defendant. 9 4 For example, in In re Otero Mills, Inc., 95 the district
court considered whether a bankruptcy court, pursuant to section 105 of
the Code, properly may enjoin a creditor's suit against the officer of a
debtor corporation.9

6

In Otero Mills, the debtor corporation, Otero Mills,

Inc. (Otero), had executed two promissory notes, each of which the corporation's president had guaranteed, in favor of Security Bank & Trust
(Security). 97 Subsequently, Otero filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the
Code and Security Bank instituted suit against Otero's president as guarantor
of the notes on which Otero failed to make installment payments. 9 The

bankruptcy court enjoined Security Bank's suit at the request of Otero's
president.9 9 The Otero Mills court explained that because Otero's plan of
reorganization required contribution of assets from Otero's president to the

91. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1002 (fourth circuit applied § 105 to extend stay to Robin's
co-defendants); 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982); 362(a)(3) (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982).
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982) (giving bankruptcy court equitable powers); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1334 (1982) (defining jurisdiction of district courts over bankruptcy cases). Section
105(a) of the Code empowers a district court sitting in bankruptcy to enjoin proceedings
against a debtor or non-debtor necessary to carry out the provisions of Title 11. 11 U.S.C. §
105(a) (1982). The proceeding that the district court sitting in bankruptcy seeks to enjoin,
however, must first come within the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to § 1334 of title 28
of the United States Code. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982) (jurisdiction of district court over
bankruptcy cases and proceedings). Section 1334, in part, confers jurisdiction to the district
courts sitting in bankruptcy over proceedings "related to" a case under the Code. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334 (1982). See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of "related to").
Accordingly, when a tort claimant files suit against a co-defendant of a Title 11 debtor, as in
Robins, the court sitting in bankruptcy first must determine that the suit is "related to" the
bankruptcy case before the court may enjoin the tort action pursuant to § 105 of the Code.
See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982) (giving bankruptcy courts equitable powers); see also Taggart,
supra note 56, at 239 (discussing of § 1334 of title 28).
93. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of "related to").
94. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing Otero Mills decision which
defined "related to").
95. 25 Bankr. 1018 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982).
96. Id. at 1019.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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debtor, the failure to enjoin would adversely affect the bankruptcy estate
and, therefore, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under Section 105 of
the Code to enjoin the Security Bank's suit against the president.1°°
Applying the Otero test to Robins illustrates that the Fourth Circuit
properly found that the bankruptcy court possessed jurisdiction to enjoin
the Dalkon Shield claimants' suit against Robins' co-defendants.101 When a
Chapter 11 debtor is obligated to indemnify its co-defendants for tort
judgments entered against the debtor's co-defendants, as in Robins, the
bankruptcy estate is affected adversely because indemnification depletes the
assets of the debtor's estate.10 2 Depleting the assets of a debtor's estate
reduces the amount of assets available to fund a plan of reorganization
and, therefore, either delays the payment to creditor's pursuant to the
reorganization plan or, if the debtors assets totally are depleted, stops
payments altogether. 103 Accordingly, under the Otero reasoning, the Fourth
Circuit properly recognized section 105 of the Code as providing jurisdiction
to enjoin the claims against Robins' co-defendantsY° 4 In addition, the basic
purpose of section 105 of the Code of providing a bankruptcy court with
the means to enjoin actions otherwise not subject to the stay, but which
interfere with the rehabilitation goals of bankruptcy, supports the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning. 05 Allowing actions to proceed against Robins co-defendants would contravene Robins' attempt to rehabilitate its financial despair
because of the company's duty to indemnify its co-defendants.1 6 Section
105, therefore, should apply to empower the court to enjoin the actions
against Robins co-defendants.107
After properly determining that the automatic stay extended to Robins'
co-defendants, the Fourth Circuit correctly recognized that the district court
possessed the power to fix the venue and to provide for the centralization
of the Dalkon Shield claims against Robins in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 0 Section 157(b)(5) of title 28 of

100. Id. at 1021.

101. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1003 (fourth circuit's finding that § 105 applied to codefendants); see 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982) (giving bankruptcy courts equitable powers); supra
notes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing Otero reasoning).
102. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (Robins is obligated to indemnify its codefendants in Dalkon Shield tort claims).
103. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (debtor in Chapter 11 reorganization is
required to file reorganization plan).
104. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1003 (fourth circuit employed § 105 to stay actions against
Robin's co-defendants); supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing Otero).
105. See I1 U.S.C. § 105 (1982) (giving bankruptcy courts equitable powers); see also 2
L. Kn G, supra note 5, § 105.02 at 105-3 (section 105 of the Code enables court to enjoin
actions interfering with rehabilitative goals of bankruptcy).
106. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (Robins is obligated to indemnify all codefendants).
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982) (giving bankruptcy courts equitable powers).
108. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1009 (fourth circuit found district court had power to fix
venue and centralize claims).
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the United States Code expressly requires the district court in which a
bankruptcy case is pending to order that trials of personal injury and

wrongful death claims against a Title 11 debtor be held in either the district
court in which the bankruptcy case is pending or in the district court in the
district where the tort claim arose.'0 9 Although section 157(b)(5) permits the
district court to fix the venue of a tort claim against a debtor in the district
where the claim arose, the Fourth Circuit correctly recognized that Congress
favored centralization of the tort actions against a Title 11 debtor.110

Centralization of tort actions against a Title 11debtor promotes the Code's
policy to protect the debtors' assets by allowing the debtor to defend the

tort claims in a single forum without incurring the delay and expense of
trials spread across the country."' Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit correctly

112
upheld the district court's authority to centralize the Dalkon Shield claims.

After concluding that section 157(b)(5) of title 28 of the United States
Code governs the transfer of personal injury tort claims against a Title 11

debtor, the Fourth Circuit properly recognized that certain provisions of
the Code necessitated centralization prior to the trials of the claims."'
Section 502(c)(1) of the Code imposes a duty upon the bankruptcy court to
estimate contingent or uniiquidated claims against a debtor when failure to

109. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 1985) (trial of personal injury claims mandated);
see also supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing § 157(b)(5)).
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 1985) (trial of personal injury claims mandated);
see also supra note 48 and accompanying text (remarks of various senators on § 157(b)(5)
evidenced no intent to favor decentralization of tort claims, against Chapter 11 debtor).
111. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (Chapter 11 designed to protect debtor's
assets and to facilitate reorganization of debtor's business finances).
112. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1010 (fourth circuit upheld district court's power to
centralize tort claims). In addition to determining correctly that section 157(b)(5) of title 28
of the United States Code authorized centralization of the tort claims against Robins, the
Fourth Circuit also properly determined that the district court should employ the procedure
set forth in section 157(b)(5) in effectuating centralization of the claims. See Robins, 788 F.2d
at 1010-11; 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 1985) (trial of personal injury claims in district
court). When a district court in which a bankruptcy case is pending orders tfie transfer,
pursuant to section 157(b)(5), of a tort action against the Title 11debtor to the district in
which the bankruptcy case is pending, the tort action immediately is transferred. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(5) (Supp.1985) (same). In contrast, § 1412 of title 28 of the United States Code
requires the party requesting a transfer of venue to petition the district court in which the
action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp 1985). With over 5,000 pending Dalkon Shield suits
across the country, however, the time and money spent litigating the propriety of each petition
required under § 1412 would detract from Robins' effort of formulating a plan of reorganization. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (debtor in Chapter 11reorganization required
to file plan of reorganization). By facilitating the debtors' ability to formulate a plan of
reorganization, § 157(b)(5) promotes the policy of affording a quick and efficient procedure
for rehabilitating the debtor's assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 1985) (trial of personal
injury claims in district court). The adoption of section 157(b)(5) to govern the transfer of
tort actions against a Title 11debtor thus promotes the bankruptcy policy goals of protecting
the debtor's assets and providing a quick and efficient reorganization of the debtor's estate.
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 1985) (same).
113. See Robins, 788 F.2d at IO1-12 (fourth circuit determined centralization of claims
proper prior to trial of claims).
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estimate unduly would delay administration of the bankrupt estate."14 The
bankruptcy court has no power, however, to estimate unliquidated or

contingent claims not properly within the bankruptcy court's venue. 1 5

Failure to centralize completely the Dalkon Shield claims within the venue
of the district court having jurisdiction over the bankruptcy proceeding,
therefore, would hinder the estimation of the claims that the Code re-

quires."16 Additionally, each Dalkon Shield plaintiff whose claim is estimated
has a right to accept the court's estimation of the claim and thus avoid
litigation. 1 7 If all the Dalkon Shield claims were centralized before the court
and fairly estimated, Robins and the claimants could avoid the time and
expense of litigation in cases in which claimants accepted the bankruptcy

court's estimation." 8 Centralization of the Dalkon Shield claims in a single
forum, therefore, would ensure that the bankruptcy court efficiently could

undertake its duty to estimate the claims, while potentially reducing the
amount of costly and time consuming litigation of the claims. 1 9
In addition to the persuasive policy reasons for allowing courts to

centralize tort actions for estimation purposes prior to trials of the claims,
federal courts have held that estimation should precede trials to facilitate
an expedient reorganization. 12 For example, in In re UNR Industries,Inc.,121
the district court considered whether estimation of tort claims against a
Chapter 11 debtor properly should precede the trial of the claims.

22

In

UNR, personal injury and wrongful death asbestos claimants petitioned the
court to allow approximately 17,000 asbestos claims against UNR Industries,
Incorporated (UNR), a Chapter 11 debtor, to proceed to trial prior to
estimation of the claims.123 The UNR court explained that the bankruptcy
114. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1982); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing
bankruptcy court's duty to estimate contingent or unliquidated claims).
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982) (estimation of contingent or unliquidated claims
necessary).
116. See id. (requiring bankruptcy court to estimate contingent or unliquidated claims).
117. See id. (estimation of contingent or unliquidated claims is for purpose of allowance).
118. See id.
119. See Id.
120. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 45 Bankr. 823, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (§ 157(b)(5) of
title 28 of the United States Code does not mandate immediate trial of tort claims against
debtor); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 45 Bankr. 827, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same).
121. 45 Bankr. 322 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
122. Id. at 323. The asbestos claimants in In re UNR first argued that because §
157(b)(2)(B) of title 28 specifies that the estimation of contingent or unliquidated claims is not
a "core proceeding," the bankruptcy court possessed no power to estimate the caims. Id. at
326; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1982) (bankruptcy court has power to set only core procedures).
The asbestos claimants, therefore, argued that because estimation is necessary to proceed with
the bankruptcy proceeding, the trials mandated by § 157(b)(5) constitute the means for
estimation. In re UNR, 45 Bankr. at 326. The UNR court rejected the asbestos claimants'
argument, noting that § 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28 recognized as core proceedings estimations of
the asbestos claims for purposes of determining the feasibility of reorganization and, therefore,
that the estimations were within the bankruptcy court's authority. Id.
123. In re UNR, 45 Bankr. at 326. The claimant's argued that because the estimation
procedure involves at least a hearing and because 17,000 hearings would be required, the
bankruptcy court's estimation is no more efficient than trial. Id.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:505

court could estimate fairly the asbestos claims without ordering hearings of
each of the 17,000 claims and, therefore, the estimation procedure would
be more efficient than trial.'2 Moreover, the UNR court recognized that
estimation of the numerous tort claims was necessary prior to trial of the
claims to determine initially the feasibility of reorganization. 125 Accordingly,
the UNR court held that the estimation of the tort claims should precede
the trials of the claims.126 The Robins case, like UNR, involves an enormous
amount of tort claims that require estimation prior to the trials of the
claims to ensure that Robins' reorganization is feasible.' 27 Because of the
necessity of estimation to determine the feasibility of reorganization, the
Fourth Circuit's decision to estimate the Dalkon Shield claims prior to trial
was consistent with UNR.'1
Although the Fourth Circuit's decision to centralize the Daikon Shield
claims promoted the efficient reorganization of Robins, effecting a change
of venue for tort claims carries due process implications for the individual
tort plaintiffs. 29 Considering the due process implications of a change of
venue for a tort claim, the Fourth Circuit properly found that notice of
the centralization served only upon the Dalkon Shield Claimants Committee
(the "Committee") for purposes of estimating the Dalkon Shield claims did
not violate the due process rights of the individual claimants. 30 A right of
action in tort constitutes property and, accordingly, is entitled to protection
against erroneous or arbitrary deprivation under the Fifth Amendment's
due process requirements.' Due process thus generally requires that prior
to changing the venue for a tort claim, which is an act that adversely can
affect or deprive the claim's value, the individual tort plaintiff must receive
notice of and an opportunity to object to the venue change. 3 2 In addition,

124. Id. The UNR court found that estimation would not require 17,000 hearings in
response to the claimants' argument that because the estimation procedure involves at least a
hearing, the bankruptcy court's estimation is no more efficient than trial. Id.
125. Id. at 326-27. The UNR court found that estimation should precede trial to determine
the feasibility of reorganization in response to the claimants' argument that because the Code
entitles a tort claimant to a trial upon request, trials should commence immediately rather
than after estimation so that when the time for distribution of the claim arrives, the claimants
immediately can collect their trial judgments. Id.
126. Id. at 327.
127. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (at time Robins filed under Chapter 11,
approximately 5,000 tort claims were pending against Robins).
128. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1012-14 (fourth circuit found estimation prior to trial
appropriate); In re UNR Indust., 45 Bankr. at 322 (UNR court estimated prior to trial).
129. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process clause).

130. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1015 (individual notice to claimants not required prior to
venue change for estimation purposes); see also supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text
(discussing Robins' decision to notify Committee and not individual claimants).
131. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process clause); see also Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-33 (1982) (right of action in tort constitutes property subject to
due process protection). Causes of action generally are considered property interests. See 2 L.
KnG, supra note 5, § 101.29 at 101-45 ("property" under the Code covers tort claims).
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process clause).
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a tort plaintiff's claim encompasses a right to a jury trial, the forum for
which also is subject to due process protection. 33 Due process is not,
however, an inflexible concept.' 3 4 Courts generally have not applied any
mechanical rule to define the extent of the hearing necessary to comply
with due process prior to a deprivation of property. 135 Courts instead have
employed a balancing test to determine the hearing procedures required by
due process prior to a deprivation of property. 36 Under the balancing test,
a conditional deprivation of an individual's property right, absent notice or
37
opportunity for a hearing, may satisfy due process in some circumstances.1
The United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridgel3 established
the dispositive balancing test for determining the nature and extent of the
hearing necessary prior to a deprivation of property to satisfy due process
requirements. 3 9 In Eldridge, the Supreme Court considered whether due
process required that the recipient of Social Security disability benefit
payments be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to
the termination of the benefits.140 In Eldridge, a state agency monitoring
the medical condition of a disability benefits recipient determined that,
based on medical reports and a questionnaire that the recipient had answered, the recipient's disability no longer existed.' 4' The Social Security
Administration (SSA) accepted the state agency's decision to terminate the
benefits, but the benefits did not officially terminate until two months after

133. Id.; see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (Mullane
establishes that place of trial enjoys due process protection); supra note 47 and accompanying
text (recognizing that tort claimant in bankruptcy is entitled to jury trial).
134. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961) (due process is not technical conception of inflexible procedures); Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (due process requires balancing
of interests recognizing that fairness changes from situation to situation); McClelland v.
Massinga, 786 F.2d 1205, 1210-16 (4th Cir. 1986) (due process is flexible and plaintiffs are
entitled to hearing prior to deprivation of tax refund).
135. See infra note 136 and accompanying text (courts do not apply mechanical rule to
determine the extent of process which is due but rather undertake balancing test).
136. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1964) (court, after balancing,
determined that no hearing required prior to terminating individuals employment); Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (court after balancing determined no hearing was required
prior to termination of individual's disability benefits). But see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (court, after balancing, determined that evidentiary hearing was required prior to
termination of individual's welfare benefits). See also infra notes 138-73 and accompanying
text (discussion of Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill and Mathews v. Eldridge decisions).
137. See supra note 136 (notice and opportunity for hearing not always needed required
prior to deprivation of property right).
138. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
139. Id. at 332-49; see Note, Proceduresfor Estimating Contingent or UnliquidatedClaims
in Bankruptcy, 35 STAr.

L. REv. 153 (1982) (discussing Eldridge balancing test in context of

contingent and unliquidated claims in bankruptcy).
140. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 323.
141. Id. at 324. Eldridge, the disability benefits recipient, originally was disabled due to
chronic anxiety and back strain and subsequently was found to have diabetes. Id.
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the date of the recipient's recovery from the disability. 142 The recipient
claimed that due process requires that an administrative review board afford
143
a disability benefits recipient a hearing prior to termination of the benefits.
The Supreme Court in Eldridge first recognized that the recipient possessed
a property interest in the disability benefits. 144 The Court explained that
determining whether the procedures for terminating the disability benefits
complied with due process required a balancing test that weighed four
critical factors. 14 5 The Supreme Court in Eldridge explained that the factors
to consider included the effect of the official action on the private interest
at stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest through
the applied procedures, the value of additional or substitute procedures and
the government's interest, including the administrative burden of new procedures on the government. 14 The Court in Eldridge recognized that the
private interest in disability benefits in general was not great because the
benefits were not based on financial need. 47 The Court also noted that
holding evidentiary hearings in all disability cases prior to the termination
of the benefits would create tremendous administrative expense. 148 Accordingly, the Court held that due process did not require that a disability

benefits recipient receive an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of
the benefits because the balancing test weighed in favor of denying a
149
pretermination hearing.

Applying the Eldridge reasoning to the Robins case supports the Fourth
Circuit's finding that notice and an opportunity for hearing are not always
required before a change of venue. 50 Several of the factors identified in the
Eldridge balancing test weigh heavily in favor of the Fourth Circuit's

142. Id. at 338. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the administrative procedure leading to a decision
to terminate disability benefits began with the state agency's determination that an individual
no longer possessed a disability. Id. The state agency's determination was reviewed by the
Social Security Administration (SSA). Id. If the SSA accepted the state agency's determination,
the recipient of the benefit was given written notification of the reasons for termination and
the right to de novo state agency reconsideration. Id. Upon acceptance by the SSA, benefits
were terminated, effective two months after the month of recovery from the disability. Id. If,
after reconsideration by the state agency and SSA review, the decision remains to terminate
the benefits, the recipient could request an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law
judge. Id. at 339.
143. Id. at 325.
144. Id. at 332.
145. Id. at 334-35.
146. Id. at 335.
147. Id. at 340-41. The Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge contrasted Goldberg v.
Kelly, in which the Court required an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of welfare
benefits, in part, because of the overriding private interest of people living at the margin of
subsistence in receiving welfare benefits. Id. at 340; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(examined hearing procedures necessary prior to termination of welfare benefits).
148. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 347-48.
149. Id. at 349.
150. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1015 (fourth circuit found notice and opportunity for hearing
not always required prior to venue change).
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position.' 5' The first factor that the Eldridge test considers is the effect of
the official action on the private interest at stake. 152 Permitting a change of
venue of the Dalkon Shield claims, absent individual notice, does not
infringe upon the tort claimants' interest in fair compensation for their
injuries because any claimant ultimately is entitled to a trial in which a jury
assessment of the tort damages will provide the claimant with an enforceable
claim, regardless of any prior estimation.'53 Moreover, the Dalkon Shield
claimants' interest in a quick, efficient recovery of their claims is served
only if the estimation process takes place prior to any objections to the
venue change. 5 4 Therefore, the official action, namely the change of venue,
does not impair the Dalkon Shield claimant's private interest at stake.
In addition to the first factor of the Eldridge test, the third factor of
the test, which considers the value of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards, also weighs heavily in favor of centralizing the Dalkon Shield
claims for purposes of estimation absent notice to the individual claimants. 5
The appellants in Robins claimed that, as an additional procedural safeguard, Robins should have provided the individual claimants with notice
prior to changing the venue for estimation purposes. 5 6 Requiring individual
notice, however, would delay the centralization of the Dalkon Shield claims
and hinder the estimation procedure that depends on centralization. 57 Hindering the estimation procedure would delay development of a reorganization
plan and, consequently, would delay rehabilitation of the debtor and payments to creditors.' Accordingly, the value of individual notice to the
Dalkon Shield claimants is minimal because requiring individual notice
59
ultimately would reduce the value of the claimants' recovery.
In allowing Robins to serve blanket notice upon the Committee, however,
the Fourth Circuit permitted initial centralization of the claims for estimation

151. See supra text accompanying note 146 (four factors to examine in determining nature
and extent of hearing necessary to satisfy due process).
152. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335; see Note, supra note 139, at 163 (discussing private
interests affected by claim estimation). When determining the private interest affected by the
official action, courts generally consider the severity of the property deprivation, the duration
of the deprivation, the reversibility of the deprivation, and the access of claimants to private
alternatives. Note, supra note 139 at 163.
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (Supp. 1985) (trial of personal injury claims in district
court); see also supra note 47 and accompanying text (section 157(b)(5) of Code permits trial
of tort claims).
154. See supra notes 113-28 and accompanying text (recognizing that estimation should
precede trial to promote efficiency).
155. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 (describing third factor of Eldridge test).
156. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1015.
157. See supra notes 113-28 and accompanying text (efficient estimation depends on
centralization of tort claims).
158. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (Chapter 11 debtor is required to file plan
of reorganization).
159. See Note, supra note 139, at 167. The threat of delay and resulting administrative
costs associated with numerous contingent and unliquidated claims against a debtor explains
the strong interest in using abbreviated hearings in settling the claims. Id.
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purposes prior to holding any hearings on individual objections. 160 Notice
served only upon the Committee obviates a situation in which the district
judge must rule on potentially thousands of objections to the transfer of
venue before undertaking any meaningful estimation of the claims.16' Moreover, when the bankruptcy court estimates all the Dalkon Shield claims,
the bankruptcy court then can require Robins to notify the individual
claimants of both the estimation figure and the fact that each claimant can
62
request a hearing in objection to the venue change for purposes of trial.
Delaying the individual plaintiffs' opportunity to object to the transfer of
venue until after the estimation of the claims may permit many plaintiffs
to forego litigation and accept the court estimation of their claim. 63 The
possibility of delay inherent in affording individual notice to the Dalkon
Shield claimants, therefore, suggests that the Fourth Circuit's procedure
allowing the conditional transfer of claims prior to affording each individual
claimant notice and an opportunity to be heard greatly outweighs the value
of the proposed alternative.1' 4
In addition to the balancing factors indicated in Eldridge, the United

States Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland Board of Education v.

160. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1015 (fourth circuit allowed centralization of tort claims
prior to hearing objections).
161. See infra note 185 and accompanying text (district judge eventually hears objections
to transfer); see also supra note 71 (discussing factors that district judge must weigh in
balancing advantages and disadvantages of changing venue). Although the Fourth Circuit in
A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin held that the notice given to the Committee for estimation
purposes met the requirements of due process, the question arises as to whether the Committee
is empowered to object to the venue change for estimation purposes on behalf of the individual
claimants as a class. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982) (discussing power of Committee). If the
claimants receive no notice of the venue change for estimation purposes, they cannot object
individually, however, possibly the Committee could. Id. If the Committee can raise due
process objections for the individual claimants, the Fourth Circuit did not consider how the
objections would be handled. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1015 (Fourth Circuit failed to address
Committee objections to due process). If a hearing were held on the Committee's objection,
only one hearing, as opposed to potentially thousands, would be required because the
Committee would represent Dalkon Shield claimants as a class. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1016
(fing day for hearings on individual claimants' objection to venue change for trial purposes).
162. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1015-16. In A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, the Fourth Circuit
held that Robins was to give notice after filing a motion for a venue change with the district
court sitting in bankruptcy, in the form of a letter, to each claimant and the claimant's
attorney. Id. at 1016. The Fourth Circuit required the notice to state that the conditionally
transferred venue and the transfer would become final if the claimant did not object to the
venue change. Id. The notice would also fix a time limit for the filing of objections by
claimants and a day for a hearing on the objections. Id. The estimation procedure, however,
should precede the giving of the notice, because the bankruptcy court's estimation of the
claims may influence whether a claimant objects to changing the trial venue. See supra note
134 and accompanying text (claimant is entitled to accept bankruptcy court's estimation).
163. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (creditors of a Title 11 debtor may accept
bankruptcy court's estimation of contingent or unliquidated claims).
164. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1015-16 (fourth circuit allowed transfer of claims prior to
notice).
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Loudermil 6 5 illustrates that an individual need not receive notice and an
opportunity for a hearing prior to deprivation of a property right when an
informal procedure is available to the individual prior to deprivation. 16 In
Cleveland Board, the Supreme Court considered whether an Ohio statute
affording civil servants an opportunity for administrative review after a
discharge from employment, but not before discharge, satisfied due process
requirements. 67 In Cleveland Board, the Board of Education of Ohio fired
a civil servant for dishonesty in filling out his employment application.'6
The Supreme Court recognized that the Ohio statute governing termination
of civil servants provided for an extensive post-termination administrative
hearing reviewing the discharge. 69 The discharged employee claimed, however, that due process required an opportunity for a hearing prior to the
termination of employment. 70 The Court in Cleveland Board balanced the
competing interests at stake and determined that individuals possess a
significant private interest in retaining employment, that some opportunity
to respond prior to termination of employment would eliminate mistaken
discharges, and that the government's interest in keeping individuals usefully
employed was great.' 7' Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board
held, after balancing the competing interests at stake, that due process
required some form of a pre-termination he'aring. 72 The Supreme Court in
Cleveland Board noted, however, that because the discharged employee was
entitled to an extensive hearing post-termination, the pre-termination hearing
need not definitely resolve the propriety of discharge, but need only provide
an opportunity for the employee to respond as an initial check against
mistakes.1'"

The Supreme Court's reasoning in Cleveland Board provides persuasive
authority for the Fourth Circuit's position that notice to the Committee
prior to centralizing the venue of the Dalkon Shield claims for estimation
only did not violate the individual claimants' due process rights. 74 By
165. 470 U.S. 532 (1984).
166. See id. at 542.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 535. In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, James Loudermill, a
civil servant, stated on his job application that he had never been convicted of a felony. Id.
The Board of Education, as part of a routine examination of Loudermill's employment records,
determined 11 months later that Loudermill had been convicted of grand larceny. Id.
169. Id.; see Omao REv. CODE ANN. § 124.34 (Baldwin 1984) (employment of classified
civil servants are terminated only for cause and may obtain administrative review of discharge).
170. Cleveland Bd., 470 U.S. at 536.
171. Id. at 542-45.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 545-46. The Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
suggests that an opportunity to respond, on the facts of Cleveland Board, only involves giving
the discharged employee an opportunity to present his side of the story to prevent initial
mistakes prior to depriving the employee of a property right. Id.

174. See Cleveland Board, 470 U.S. at 545 (pre-deprivation hearing required only in
certain circumstances); Robins, 788 F.2d at 1015 (notice to Committee prior to centralizing
proper).
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analogy, the notice to the Committee and the Committee's representation

of the individual claimants at the estimation hearing provided the claimants
with an informal procedure that acted as an initial check against any
mistakes, as contemplated in Cleveland Board.7 5 The subsequent trial of
the Dalkon Shield claims after the estimation procedure represents the
extensive administrative hearing that due process requires prior to a final
deprivation of property. 76 Accordingly, Robins' notice to the Committee
prior to centralization of the claims appears to satisfy due process under
the Cleveland Board reasoning, provided Robins affords the individual
claimants with notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the transfer
77
of venue becomes final for trial purposes.
The Cleveland Board reasoning further suggests that the Fourth Circuit's

determination that notice to the Claimants Committee alone suffices for
purposes of estimating the Dalkon Shield claims contemplates that notice
upon the Committee is mandatory, rather than optional. 78 Although the
Dalkon Shield Claimants Committee is not empowered to represent individual claimants, the Committee is empowered to represent the whole class of
plaintiffs at the estimation hearing.

79

Therefore, the notice to the Committee

and the Committee's representation of the class of claimants at the estimation proceeding provides the initial check against any inappropriate
transfers, as contemplated by the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board."0

The practical effect of not notifying the Committee prior to the estimation
hearing would be to deny the Dalkon Shield claimants any opportunity to

175. See Cleveland Board, 470 U.S. at 545 (pre-deprivation hearing is check against
mistakes).
176. See id. at 547-48 (Cleveland Board court recognizes extensive post-termination hearing).
177. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1015-16 (Robins required to give notice prior to centralization).
178. See id. at 1015 (notice to Committee alone sufficient for estimation); Cleveland
Board, 470 U.S. at 542-45 (Cleveland Bd. reasoning).
179. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (1982) (creditors committee may participate in formulation
of Chapter 11 reorganization plan); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5) (1982) (creditors committee
may perform services in interest of those represented). Section 1103 of the Code expressly
permits a Chapter 11 creditors committee to participate in the formulation of a debtor's plan
of reorganization, and to perform other services in the interest of the creditors that the
committee represents. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (1982); see 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5) (1982) (same).
Because the estimation hearing focuses on the examination of a class of claims both to
determine the feasibility of reorganization and to arrive at a figure for inclusion in the plan
of reorganization, and because committee representation of all individual claimants at the
estimation proceeding constitutes a service to the claimants, the committee perhaps can represent
all claimants at the hearing. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (1982) (creditors committee may
participate in formulation of Chapter 11 reorganization plan); 11 U.S.C. § I103(c)(5) (1982)
(creditors committee may perform services in interest of those represented); see also Note, The
Chapter 11 Creditor's Committee: Statutory Watchdog?, 2 BANKR. DEv. J. 247, 252-62 (1985)
(discussing § 1103(c)(3) and (c)(5) of Code).
180. See Cleveland Bd., 470 U.S. at 545.
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express their position on the claims. 8' The Fourth Circuit expressly recognized, however, that the purpose of the estimation hearing is to hear the
interests of all claimants. 8 2 Notice upon the Committee is required prior to
centralizing the claims in the bankruptcy court to ensure that the centralization complies with due process. 3
Although notice served only upon the Dalkon Shield Claimants Committee satisfies due process with regard to the centralization of the claims
for estimation purposes, the Fourth Circuit found that due process requires
that each individual claimant receive notice and an opportunity to respond

before the transfer of venue may become final.14 When an individual tort
plaintiff objects to the venue change, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Robins
requires the district judge to engage in a balancing test to determine the
necessity of transfer. 8 The Fourth Circuit suggested guidelines for the
district judge to follow when considering objections to the venue change,
but did not outline explicitly the relative importance of factors to consider
when balancing. 86 Other courts considering the transfer of venue issue,
however, have provided guidelines in determining the factors that courts
should consider in determining the necessity of a venue change.'1 7 For
example, in In re Cole Associates,'88 the bankruptcy court found that the
single most important factor in determining whether a venue change is
appropriate is whether a transfer of venue promotes the efficient and
economic administration of the debtor's estate. 89 Applying the Fourth
Circuit's suggested guidelines and Cole's reasoning to the Robins bankruptcy
proceeding, the forum of the bankruptcy proceeding is the most appropriate
forum for venue of the tort claims because Robins will not be forced to

181. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1015 (notice to individual claimants not required prior to
venue change for estimation and, therefore, individual claimants have no opportunity to voice
opinion at estimation hearing).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1016; see supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing factors in Robins
balancing test).
186. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1016 (fourth circuit's guidelines for balancing); see supra
note 71 and accompanying text (discussing factors in balancing test).
187. See In re Nixon Machinery Co., 27 Bankr. 871, 873 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983)
(paramount consideration in transferring venue is speedy and economic administration of
bankruptcy proceeding); In re Whippany Paper Board Co., 15 Bankr. 312, 317 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1981) (important factor to determine the propriety of venue change is whether transfer of
venue promotes efficient and economic administration of estate).
188. 7 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. Utah 1980).
189. Id. at 157. In In re Cole Assocs., the bankruptcy court considered whether to uphold
several creditors' motions to transfer venue from the bankruptcy court to the creditors'
respective forums. Id. at 156. In Cole, a Chapter 11 debtor (Cole) instituted an adversary
proceeding to recover property, which was allegedly property of the debtor's estate, that three
creditors held. Id. at 155. The creditors subsequently petitioned the court- to transfer the venue
of the action to the creditors' forums. Id.
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expend time and money defending claims in forums throughout the coun9
try. 0
In light of the multiplicity of claims involving the Dalkon Shield, the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Robins represents the most liberal reading of
the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision and other provisions governing the transfer of venue for actions against a debtor.1 9' The Fourth
Circuit's liberal reading of the automatic stay provision, however, is consistent with congressional intent concerning Chapter 11 of the Code to
facilitate the financial rehabilitation of business debtors. 192 The Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Robins represents significant precedent on which the
federal courts can rely in recognizing the broad statutory and inherent
powers of a bankruptcy court in complex Chapter 11 cases to stay any
proceeding that potentially can deplete the assets of the debtor's estate or
adversely affect the debtor's ability to reorganize. 93 Similarly, the Fourth
Circuit's decision to centralize the venue of tort claims against a Chapter 11
debtor for purposes of estimating the claims, without requiring individual
notice to claimants, evinces a broad power afforded to bankruptcy courts
to facilitate and protect the debtor's reorganization efforts. 9 4 Enabling the
bankruptcy court to centralize claims against a Chapter 11 debtor and to
estimate the claims without notifying individual claimants permits the debtor's reorganization to proceed immediately. 195 Moreover, the estimation
procedure potentially reduces the amount of the debtor's assets required to
litigate the claims because creditors may accept the estimated figure and
forego trial.9 6 Furthermore, individual claimants who request trials because
of dissatisfaction with the bankruptcy court's estimation of the value of
their claims most likely will have the burden of attempting to convince the
district judge that trial venue in the bankruptcy court will not promote the
efficient administration of the bankrupt's estate.' 97 The Fourth Circuit's

190. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 1016 (suggesting guidelines to determine propriety of venue
change for Dalkon Shield claims); In re Cole, 7 Bankr. at 157 (suggesting guidelines for
determining propriety of venue change in a bankruptcy case).
191. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (automatic stay provision of Code); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(5) (1982) (governing transfer of venue for actions against a debtor); supra note 5 and
accompanying text (discussing purposes of automatic stay); supra note 47 and accompanying
text (discussing § 157(b)(5)).
. 192. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (purposes of Chapter 11 reorganization);
11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (automatic stay provision).
193. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text (summary of Robins decision regarding
automatic stay).
194. See supra notes 46-72 and accompanying text (summary of Robins decision regarding
centralization of Dalkon Shield claims).
195. See supra notes 108-90 and accompanying text (discussion of centralization of Dalkon
Shield claims and notice requirements regarding centralization).
196. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (Dalkon Shield claimants can accept
bankruptcy court's estimation of Dalkon Shield claims).
197. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (most important factor in determining
whether to transfer venue of claims against debtor is whether transfer promotes economic and
efficient administration of debtor's estate).
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decision in Robins v. Piccinin thus provides flexible guidelines to bankruptcy
courts and evinces the broad range of powers available to the courts
effectively to protect and facilitate debtors attempting to reorganize under
the Bankruptcy Code. 9 '
DAVID WALSH

C. Sumy v. Schlossberg: Exempting Entireties Property Under Section
522(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

In 1978 Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act (the "Code")' to
provide debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate debtors' distressed finances

2
and to provide equitable treatment among the creditors of bankrupt debtors.

To facilitate these goals, section 541 of the Code establishes an estate upon

198. See Robins, 788 F.2d at 994-1016.

1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) amended by Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. In 1970 Congress
appointed a commission (the "Commission") to study existing bankruptcy laws and suggest
reforms in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act). See Report of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973)
[hereinafter Commission Report] (discussing findings of Commission Report) reprinted in 2
app. L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 (15th ed. 1985); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,
30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). In its report,the Commission stated that the two primary goals
of bankruptcy law are to rehabilitate the finances of a debtor in bankruptcy so that the debtor
again may contribute economically to society, and to provide stability to debtor-creditor
relationships in a credit-based economy. Id. The commission's findings evidenced greater
sophistication in debtor-creditor relationships. Id. Given the commission's findings, Congress
determined a need to modernize bankruptcy law to deal with debtor-creditor relationships and
to maintain the equitable policies of bankruptcy law. Id. Consequently, Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "Code") to modernize federal bankruptcy law. See 11
U.S.C. § 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (Code); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
1-2 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 SENATE REPoRT](discussing findings of Commission), reprintedin
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5787-88.
2. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 1 (purpose of bankruptcy law is to facilitate
rehabilitation of debtor's distressed finances and to provide equal treatment among creditors
of bankrupt debtors); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1977) [hereinafter
1977 HOUSE REPoRT](discussing goals of Code), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5693, 6078-79. Congress designed the Code to relieve debtors of creditor hassle and the
worry of overburdening debt when debtors overextend their financial resources. 1977 HousE
REPORT, supra, at 125. Congress structured the Code, therefore, to discharge a bankrupt
debtor from creditor obligations and allowing the debtor to retain a portion of the debtor's
property upon discharge from bankruptcy. Id. at 6078.
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a debtor's filing for relief under the Code.' The estate that section 541
creates includes all of a debtor's legal and equitable interests in both real4
and personal property as of the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding.

Upon the creation of an estate, section 363 of the Code authorizes a trustee
in bankruptcy 5 to administer the property of the estate for the benefit of a
debtor's creditors. 6 More specifically, section 363(f) of the Code authorizes
a trustee to sell property of an estate free and clear of all interests in the

property, other than a co-owner's interest in such property. 7 Section 363(h)
of the Code, however, excepts from the general provisions of section 363(f)
property that a debtor owns as a tenant by the entirety (entireties property)'

3. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 541 of the Code defines property of
the estate as all legal and equitable interests that the debtor has in property as of the
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. Id.; see 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at
82 (discussing property in estate). Property of the estate may be real or personal, and includes
property that a debtor subsequently may exempt from the estate under section 522(b) of the
Code. See 1978 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 1 at 82 (discussing property in estate); 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (allowing debtor to exempt property from estate).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see supra note 3 (discussing property that
debtor includes in estate which section 541(a) of Code creates).
5. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-704 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(providing for appointment and
duties of trustee). Upon a debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition, Chapter 7 of the Code
requires that a trustee preside over the estate. See id. §§ 701-702 (providing for appointment
and election of trustee to govern estate). The duties of a trustee include liquidating the estate
and efficiently winding up the estate in a manner that best represents the interests of the
debtor and creditor. Id. § 704; see 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 379 (principal duties
of trustee are liquidating and winding up estate in efficient manner); see also 11 U.S.C. §§
1104-1106 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(providing for appointment and duties of trustee under
Chapter 11); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1302 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(providing for appointment and duties
of trustee under Chapter 13).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 363(b)(1) of the Code authorizes
a trustee, after the trustee provides interested parties an opportunity for notice and hearing,
to use, sell, or lease estate property for the benefit of creditors of the debtor. Id.; see supra
note 3 (discussing property in estate).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at
345 (authorizing trustee to sell estate property free and clear of all interests). Section 363(f)
of the Code authorizes the trustee to sell the debtor's property free and clear of any interest
in such property of an entity other than the estate if: (1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits
the sale; (2) the entity consents to the sale; (3) the entity's interest is a lien and the sale price
of the property exceeds the amount that the lien secures; (4) the interest is in bona fide
dispute; or (5) if a court can compel the entity to accept a money satisfaction of the entity's
interest in the property in a legal or equitable proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
8. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 210-16
(1984) [hereinafter CUNNINrA & STOEBUCK]. Tenancy by the entirety is a form of concurrent
ownership of real or personal property between a husband and wife. Id. at 210. In a tenancy
by the entirety, when one spouse dies, full title in the entireties property vests in the surviving
spouse. Id. at 214. Under the law of most jurisdictions, neither the husband nor wife
individually can convey, encumber, or subject to the satisfaction of creditors' claims the other
spouse's right to the possessory estate or right of survivorship in entireties property. Id. at
214. A tenancy by the entirety vests in a husband and wife when the husband and wife acquire
an interest in property at the same time and by the same instrument. Id. Additionally, the
interests of the husband and wife must be identical regarding the fractional share and type of
estate, and regarding rights of possession. Id. at 212.
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or a joint tenant.9 Section 363(h) of the Code specifically authorizes a
trustee to sell the interest in entireties or joint tenancy property owned by
the co-owner of a debtor only when the benefit to the estate of selling the
property outweighs any detriment to the co-owner of the property.' 0
Notwithstanding the trustee's power to sell property of an estate under
section 363(h) of the Code, section 522(b) of the Code allows debtors, in
certain circumstances, to exempt from the estate a debtor's interest in
entireties and joint tenancy property that the debtor otherwise would include
in the estate under section 541(a) of the Code. 1 Section 522(b) entitles a
debtor proceeding under the Code to exempt from the estate either property
for which state and federal nonbankruptcy law authorizes an exemption or
property for which the Code authorizes an exemption.' 2 When a debtor

9. See CUNNINGITAM & STOEBUCK, supra note 8, at 202-07 (1982). Joint tenancy is a
form of concurrent ownership of real or personal property between two or more persons who
may or may not be husband and wife. Id. at 203. In a joint tenancy, which carries the right
of survivorship, when one co-owner of the property dies, full title in the property vests in the
surviving owners. Id. at 202. Under the law of most jurisdictions, a co-owner who transfers
his interest will destroy the joint tenancy in favor of a tenancy in common to the extent of
the transferring co-owner's interest in the property. Id. at 205. Additionally, under the law of
most states, the transfer of the property specifically must provide for the right of survivorship.
Id. at 206-07.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(permitting sale of co-owner's interest in
property in which debtor has undivided interest as tenant by entirety or joint tenant); see In
re Trickett, 14 Bankr. 85, 90 (Bankr. W.D. Mich 1981) (§ 363(h) of Code authorizes trustee
to sell entireties property in bankruptcy estate for benefit of joint creditors of individual debtor
and debtor's nonfiling spouse).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (providing for exemptions under
Code); Commission Report, supra note 1, at 125-27 (exemptions provide means for rehabilitation of debtor's distressed finances); 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(discussing
property of estate). In its report to Congress, the Commission explained that a provision
enabling debtors to exempt certain interests in property from an estate would best achieve
Congress' primary goal of bankruptcy, which is the rehabilitation of a debtor's distressed
finances. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 125. To facilitate rehabilitation of a debtor's
finances, Congress created § 522(b) of the Code which allows debtors to exempt certain interests
in property from an estate and, therefore, from the claims of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)
(1982); see also In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. 85, 89 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981)(exemptions provide
means of reaching Congressional goal of rehabilitating debtor by allowing debtor to keep
certain property); but cf. 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5792 (Congress did not design
exemptions to give debtors instant affluence);
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 522(b) of the Code allows
debtors to choose between federal exemptions under the Code and exemptions under applicable
state law or federal nonbankruptcy law. Id. Debtors cannot, however, simultaneously choose
both federal exemptions and state and federal nonbankruptcy exemptions. 3 L. KING, supra
note I, § 522.02 at 522.12; see also Canaday v. Wilson, 653 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1981)(when
debtors file joint bankruptcy petition, section 522(b) of Code does not allow one debtor to
choose federal exemptions and other debtor to choose state and federal nonbankruptcy law
exemptions). Under § 522(b), however, individual states may limit debtors to exemptions that
state and federal nonbankruptcy law provides. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III
1985)(permitting states to lmit debtors to state and federal nonbankruptcy law exemptions);
Canaday, 653 F.2d at 12. This opt out provision represents a compromise between the House
of Representatives, which wanted exclusive federal exemptions, and the Senate, which desired
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elects to exempt property under state and federal nonbankruptcy law, section
522(b)(2)(B) of the Code allows the debtor to exempt from the estate the
debtor's interest in entireties or joint tenancy property, to the extent that
the debtor's interest is immune from process under applicable nonbankruptcy
law. 3 Because property that a debtor exempts under section 522(b) of the

Code does not remain in the estate, a trustee may not administer the
property under section 363(h) of the Code. 14 Uncertainty exists among courts,
however, concerning the extent that section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code permits
a debtor to exempt the debtor's interest in entireties and joint tenancy
property from the estate and, therefore, from administration by the trustee

6
5
in bankruptcy under section 363(h) of the Code. In Sumy v. SchlossbergM

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered

whether section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code authorizes an individual debtor to
exclude entireties property from an estate when the debtor owes debts to

7
unsecured creditors jointly with the debtor's nonfiling spouse.1
In Sumy the debtor, filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter
7 of the Code' 8 in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland.' 9
The debtor filed a schedule of debts that included unsecured debts which
the debtor had incurred jointly with the debtor's nonfiling spouse prior to

filing a bankruptcy petition.

The debtor also filed a schedule of property

that included the debtor's home, to which the debtor and his spouse held

to involve states in determining exemptions. See 124 CONG. REc. S. 17,412 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978)(opt out provision of § 522(b)(1) of Code represents compromise between House and
Senate); see also Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 1059, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983)(even if state opts
out, no minimum number on state exemptions exists).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(permitting debtor to exempt property
in estate).
15. See Liberty State Bank & Trust v. Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir.
1985)(disallowing exemption of entireties property under § 522(b)(2)(B) and allowing trustee
to administer property under § 363(h)); Chippenham Hosp., Inc. v. Bondurant 716 F.2d 1057,
1059 (4th Cir. 1983) § §(disallowing exemption of entireties property under § 522(b)(2)(B) but
not considering whether trustee may administer property under § 363(h)); In re Ford, 3 Bankr.
559, 575 (Bankr. Md. 1980).
16. 777 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1985).
17. Id. at 922.
18. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(Chapter 7 of Code). Under a Chapter 7
proceeding a debtor must forfeit to the trustee all property of the debtor's estate that the
debtor may not exempt under § 522 of the Code. Id. § 704; see id. § 521(4) (debtor must
surrender all property of estate to trustee). The trustee then distributes the assets of the estate
for the benefit of the debtors creditors. Id. § 704. The purpose of Chapter 7 is to liquidate
the debtor's bankruptcy estate to relieve the debtor of outstanding creditor obligations. 1977
House REPORT, supranote 2, at 379; see Burlinham v. Grouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913)(purpose
of Chapter 7 is to liquidate debtor's assets and distribute proceeds to creditors to relieve
debtors of debts).
19. Sumy v. Schlossberg, 46 Bankr. 217, 218 (D. Md. 1985).
20. Id. The debtor in Sumy scheduled a total of $19,575.50 in unsecured claims. Id. Of
the total amount of claims, $1474.78 constituted claims that the debtor owed jointly with the
debtor's nonfiling spouse. Id.
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title jointly as tenants by the entirety. 2' The debtor claimed the equity in
22
the home as exempt from the estate under section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code.
The debtor argued that Maryland common law did not permit joint creditors
of an individual debtor to execute against the debtor's individual, undivided
interest in entireties property. 2 Accordingly, the debtor argued that section
522(b)(2)(B) of the Code permitted the debtor to exempt the equity interest
in the home owned as tenants by the entirety from the estate.24 The trustee
objected to the debtor's claimed exemption and sought to administer the
entireties property under section 363(h) for the benefit of the joint creditors
of the debtor and the debtor's nonfiling spouse. 25 In considering the trustee's
objection, the bankruptcy court explained that section 522(b)(2)(B) of the
Code entitles a debtor to exempt the debtor's interest in entireties property
from the estate only to the extent that the interest is not subject to levy
and execution under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 26 The bankruptcy court
then determined that under Maryland common law, joint creditors may
enforce a judgment against joint debtors by executing against property that
joint debtors hold as tenants by the entirety. 27 The court then found that
because the debtor and his spouse held title to the home as tenants by the
entirety, Maryland common law would permit joint creditors to execute
against the entireties property to satisfy the joint creditors' claims against
the debtor and his nonfiling spouse. 28 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court
held that section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code did not authorize the debtor to
29
exempt the entireties property from the bankruptcy estate.
The debtor appealed the bankruptcy court's holding to the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland. 30 In considering whether the
individual debtor could exempt entireties property from the estate, the
district court recognized that section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code allows debtors
to exempt the debtor's interest in entireties property from the estate to the
extent that the interest is not subject to levy and execution under state

21. Id. In Sumy the debtor and the debtor's spouse owned as tenants by the entirety a
home worth $72,500. Id. The equity in the debtors' home amounted to approximately $20,000.
Id. at n.1; see supra note 8 (discussing common law principles of tenancy by the entirety).
22. Sumy v. Schlossberg, 46 Bankr. 217, 218 (D. Md. 1985); 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(2)(B)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
23. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at 218; see supra note 8 (discussing common law principles of
tenancy by entirety).
24. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at 218; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (§ 522(b)(2)(B)
of Code allows debtor to exclude interests in entireties property from estate to extent that
interests not subject to creditor process under state law); supra note 8 (under common law,
individual undivided interest in.entireties property is not subject to creditor claims).
25. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at 218; 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (1982); see Fam. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)
(trustee must object to debtor's claimed exemptions within 30 days from time that debtor files
schedule of exempt property).
26. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at 218; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
27. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at 218.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code).
30. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at 217.
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law. 31 The district court then examined Maryland common law and determined that joint creditors cannot execute against a debtor's individual,
undivided interest in entireties property.3 2 The district court in Sumy explained that under section 541 of the Code, only a debtor's individual,
undivided interest in entireties property becomes part of the estate in
bankruptcy. 3 The district court in Sumy found that because only the
individual debtor's undivided interest in entireties property, (rather than the
actual entireties property), became part of the bankrupt estate, joint creditors
could not execute against the interest under Maryland common law. 34 The
district court held, therefore, that section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code allowed
the debtor to exempt the debtor's equity interest in the debtor's home from
35
the estate.
The trustee appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.3 6 In considering whether section
522(b)(2)(B) of the Code allows an individual debtor to exempt the debtor's
interest in entireties property from the estate when the debtor owes debts
jointly with the debtor's nonfiling spouse, the Fourth Circuit first recognized
that upon the filing of a petition for relief under the Code, all of a debtor's
legal and equitable interests in entireties property as of the time of filing

31. Id. at 218-19; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
32. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at 219; see supra note 8 (discussing common law principles of
tenancy by the entirety).
33. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at 219; see supra note 3 (discussing property of estate).
34. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at 219-21; see supra note 8 (discussing common law principles of
tenancy by entirety). In finding that unsecured joint creditors cannot proceed against an
individual joint debtor's interest in entireties property under Maryland common law, the district
court in Sumy relied on the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in In re Ford. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at
217; see In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559 (Bankr. Md. 1980). In Ford the Fourth Circuit considered
whether an individual debtor may exempt entireties property from an estate when the debtor
has incurred joint debts with the debtor's spouse. Ford, 3 Bankr. at 562. The Ford court first
found that only the debtor's interest in entireties property, and not the entireties property
itself, becomes part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate under § 541(a) of the Code. Id. at 575;
see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(providing for property of estate); see supra
note 3 (discussing property in estate). The Ford court then reasoned that because under
Maryland common law neither individual nor joint creditors can execute against a debtor's
individual, undivided interest in entireties property, § 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code allows debtors
to exempt their interest in entireties property from the bankrupt estate. Ford, 3 Bankr. at 576.
The Ford court noted, however, that joint creditors could, nonetheless, proceed in state court
to unify the joint debtors' individual, undivided interests in entireties property, obtain and
enforce a joint judgment against the debtors, and satisfy the judgment out of the debtors'
entireties property. Id.
35. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at 221; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The
district court in Sumy found that section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code permitted the debtor to
exclude his interest in entireties property from the estate because the joint creditor could not
execute on the individual debtor's undivided interest in entireties property that became part of
the estate under § 541(a) of the Code. Sumy, 46 Bankr. at 221; see supra note 34 and
accompanying text (district court in Ford explained that only individual debtors' undivided
interest in entireties property, and not entireties property itself, becomes part of estate).
36. Sumy v. Schlossberg, 777 F.2d 921, 922 (4th Cir. 1985).
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became part of the estate.3 7 The Sumy court then noted that section
522(b)(2)(B) authorizes debtors to exempt entireties property interests from
the estate only to the extent that the interests are exempt from process
under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 35 The Sumy court next examined
Maryland common law to determine whether joint creditors may execute
upon an individual debtor's interest in entireties property when the debtor
has incurred debts jointly with the debtor's nonfiling spouse.3 9 The Fourth
Circuit explained that under Maryland common law a joint creditor with a
claim against only one spouse cannot levy and execute on the entireties
property held between the spouses. 40 The Sumy court further explained,
however, that Maryland common law permitted a creditor with a claim
against both spouses to proceed in state court to obtain a joint judgment
against both spouses and execute upon the entireties property to satisfy the
joint creditor's judgment. 4' The Fourth Circuit determined, therefore, that
when a joint debtor files an individual petition for relief under the Code,
a joint creditor of both the individual debtor and the debtor's nonf'ling
spouse may petition the bankruptcy court for relief from the automatic
stay, 42 obtain a judgment against the joint debtors, and satisfy the judgment
out of the joint debtors' entireties property. 43 The Fourth Circuit held,
accordingly, that because the joint creditor in Sumy possessed a joint claim
against the debtor and the debtor's nonfiling spouse that was enforceable
in state court, section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code did not authorize the debtor

37. Id. at 923; see supra note 3 (discussing property in estate).
38. Sumy v. Schlossberg, 777 F.2d at 926; 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(2)(B), 363(h) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985); see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (trustee may not administer
property that is not in debtor's bankrupt estate).
39. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 926; see supra note 8 (discussing common law principles of
tenancy by entirety).
40. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 926.
41. Id. at 926-27. The Sumy court explained that in a bankruptcy proceeding, an
unsecured joint creditor can petition the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay and
proceed in state court to obtain a joint judgment against the individual debtor and the debtor's
nonfiling spouse. Id. at 927. The Sumy court then explained that under Maryland law a
creditor who possesses a joint judgment against a debtor and the debtor's nonfiling spouse
may execute against the entireties property of the debtor and the debtor's nonfiling spouse to
satisfy the judgment. Id. Additionally, the Sumy court noted that because no joint creditors
existed in Ford, any holdings in Ford concerning joint creditors constituted dicta. rd.; see
Ford, 3 Bankr. at 926 (joint creditors did not exist in Ford); supra note 33 (discussing Ford).
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(bankruptcy court grants relief from
automatic stay for benefit of party in interest for valid cause). A debtor's fling for relief
under the Code automatically imposes a stay against practically all attempts by creditors to
collect the debtor's outstanding financial obligations. Id. § 362(a). The automatic stay continues
until property is no longer part of the estate or until the bankruptcy court grants relief from
the stay under § 363(d) of the Code. Id. § 363(d); see Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 767
(4th Cir. 193 1)(bankruptcy court grants joint creditors relief from automatic stay to prevent
inequity caused by not allowing joint creditors to collect outstanding debts of joint debtors).
43. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 928; supra note 8 (discussing common law principles of tenancy
by entirety).
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to exempt the debtor's interest in the entireties property from the estate.4
The Sumy court further held that because the entireties property remained
in the estate, the trustee could administer the entireties property under
45
section 363(h) of the Code.
In support of its holding, the Fourth Circuit maintained that excluding
the debtor's interest in entireties property from the estate in Sumy would
result in an inequitable treatment of the joint creditor.4 The Fourth Circuit
noted that section 522(f)(1) of the Code allows a debtor to avoid judicial
liens against estate property to the extent that the lien impairs an exemption
that section 522(b)(2)(B) otherwise authorizes. 47 The Fourth Circuit further

noted that section 522(c) of the Code provides that once property is exempt
from the estate, the property is not available to satisfy creditor's claims
that arose before the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition. 4 The Fourth

Circuit explained that section 522(f)(1) and section 522(b) allow a debtor
permanently to avoid judicial liens on entireties property and exempt interests in entireties property from the bankruptcy estate, and thus effectively
prevent joint creditors from executing against the entireties property either

44. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 928.
45. Id. at 932; 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In addition to the Sumy
court's holding that § 363(h) of the Code permits a trustee to sell entireties property, the
Sumy court found that a creditor nonetheless may petition the bankruptcy court to lift the
automatic stay and proceed in state court against a debtor's entireties property. Sumy, 777
F.2d at 932; see supra note 10 and accompanying text (§ 363(h) allows trustee to sell entireties
property that debtor may not exempt from estate pursuant to § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code).
46. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 929-32; see infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing
equitable policies that Fourth Circuit considered in determining that 522(b)(2)(B) of Code did
not allow debtor to exempt entireties property from estate).
47. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 930; 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(2)(B), 522(0(1) 1982 & Supp. III 1985).
The Sumy court noted that § 522(f)(1) of the Code allows debtors, either before discharge
from bankruptcy or by post discharge complaint, to avoid a judicial lien that attaches to the
debtor's property before the debtor files a bankruptcy petition. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 930; see
11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (judicial lien is lien that creditor obtains by
judgment, levy, sequestration or other legal or equitable proceeding). The Fourth Circuit
explained that a debtor may avoid a judicial lien that arises after discharge by filing a postdischarge complaint that claims that the judicial lien impairs an exemption that § 522(b) of
the Code authorizes. Id. at 930 n.22. The Sumy court further explained that allowing debtors
to avoid judicial liens that arise both before and after the debtor obtains a discharge from
bankruptcy prevents inequitable treatment between creditors possessing prepetition and postpetition judicial liens solely because of the timing of the lien. Id.
48. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 930-31; 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Sumy
court recognized that § 522(c) of the Code compliments §§ 522(b) and (f) by generally insulating
property that is exempt under § 522(b) and (f) from claims of creditors that arose before the
commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 930; 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (1982
& Supp. III 1985). The Fourth Circuit in Sumy then explained that because § 522(c) of the
Code protects a debtor's exempt property from prepetition claims of creditors, even those
joint creditors who lift the automatic stay to proceed against a debtor's property in state court
cannot proceed to satisfy outstanding claims against the property that the debtor has exempted
under §522(b) of the Code. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 930-31; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)-(c) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
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during or after the bankruptcy proceeding. 49 Additionally, the Sumy court

determined that preventing a debtor from exempting an interest in entireties
property from the estate places all similarly situated joint creditors under

the jurisdiction of a single bankruptcy proceeding.50 The Fourth Circuit
recognized that a single judicial proceeding eliminates the need for a creditor

to lift the automatic stay and proceed in state court to obtain a lien on the
debtor's entireties property. 51 The Sumy court further recognized that a

single judicial proceeding enables debtors to quickly rehabilitate distressed
finances and enhances judicial efficiency.5 2 The Sumy court found, therefore,
49. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 931; 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b),(f)(l) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The
Sumy court recognized that §§ 522(f) and (c) of the Code were ineffective unless a debtor
could exempt property under § 522(b) of the Code. Id. The Sumy court explained, therefore,
that not allowing the debtor in Sumy to exempt entireties property from the estate would
allow the trustee to administer the entireties property under § 363(h) of the Code. Id. The
Fourth Circuit in Sumy added that its holding thus prevented debtors from excluding entireties
property from an estate that equitably should be available to satisfy the claims of joint
creditors. Id. at 929. The Sumy court characterized the exclusion from an estate of entireties
property that equitably should be available to satisfy joint creditors' claims as legal fraud.
Id.; see Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765 (4th Cir. 1931)(defining legal fraud). In Phillips
v. Krakower, the Fourth Circuit defined legal fraud as the effective withdrawing of a debtor's
property from the reach of creditors who are entitled to the property. Id. The Fourth Circuit
in Phillips recognized that bankruptcy courts must prevent debtors from committing legal
fraud. Id. at 765. In Phillips the Fourth Circuit permitted an unsecured creditor to petition
the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay and proceed in state court to obtain and
enforce a joint judgment against an individual debtor and the debtor's nonf'ling spouse. Id.
at 766. The Phillips court explained that not allowing a joint creditor to proceed in state court
permits an individual debtor to perpetuate fraud by shielding assets from creditors that are
properly applicable to the satisfaction of creditors' claims. Id. The Phillipscourt characterized
legal fraud as "shocking to the conscience." Id.
50. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 932. The Sumy court explained that when a debtor may exempt
an interest in entireties property from the debtor's bankrupt estate under § 522(b)(2)(B) of the
Code, each joint creditor must petition the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay so that
the joint creditor may levy and execute against the debtor's property in state court. Id. The
Sumy court recognized, however, that when § 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code does not authorize a
debtor to exempt an interest in entireties property from the debtor's estate, a trustee can
administer entireties property under § 363(h) of the Code. Id. The Fourth Circuit explained
that, consequently, each creditor does not have to proceed in state court to satisfy the debtor's
outstanding obligation to the joint creditor. Id.; 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(h), 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
51. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 932; see supra note 50 (discussing creditors' rights against debtors'
entireties property in bankruptcy proceeding).
52. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 932. The Sumy court explained that when § 522(b)(2)(B) of the
Code authorizes debtors to exempt an interest in entireties property from an estate, joint
creditors must petition the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay to proceed in state
court to obtain and enforce a judgment against joint debtors. Id. The Fourth Circuit found
that requiring joint creditors to proceed in state court against joint debtors delays a debtor's
discharge from bankruptcy due to the multiple judicial proceedings. Id. The Sumy court
further found that the delay in discharging a debtor from bankruptcy prevents the debtor
from promptly rehabilitating distressed finances and economically contributing to society. Id.
The Sumy court determined that a single judicial proceeding in bankruptcy benefits both the
debtor and creditor by eliminating the costs and delays that multiple judicial proceedings cause.
Id.; see supra note 1 (primary goal of bankruptcy is to rehabilitate debtors distressed finances
so that debtor again can contribute to society).
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that policy considerations dictate that a debtor cannot exempt interests in
entireties property from the estate under section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code
when joint creditors otherwise could execute against the entireties property
53
in state court.
The Fourth Circuit correctly held that an individual debtor cannot exempt
the debtor's interest in entireties property from an estate in bankruptcy to
the extent that the individual debtor owes a joint debt with the co-owner
of entireties property.5 4 Both judicial precedent and policy considerations
concerning the exemption of entireties property from an estate support the
Fourth Circuit's holding.5 5 For example, in Ragsdale v. Genesco, Inc.5 6 the
Fourth Circuit considered whether section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code authorized joint debtors to exclude entireties property from an estate when a
creditor possesses a prebankruptcy joint judgment against the debtors.17 In
Ragsdale the debtors suffered a prebankruptcy joint judgment that resulted
in a lien against the property that the debtors owned as tenants by the
entirety. 5 After filing a joint petition for relief under the Code, the debtors
attempted to exempt their equity interest in their entireties property from
the estate under section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code.5 9 The Ragsdale court

53. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 929-32; 11 U.S.C. § 522(B)(2)(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see
supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (discussing policy considerations in Sumy).
54. See infra notes 55-104 and accompanying text (discussing Sumy).
55. See Liberty State Bank & Trust v. Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir. 1985)(§
363(h) of Code authorizes trustee to administer entireties property not exempt under §
522(b)(2)(B) of Code); Chippenham Hosp., Inc. v. Bondurant, 716 F.2d 1057, 1058 (4th Cir.
1983)(§ 522(b)(2)(B) of Code does not authorize jointly indebted debtor filing individually for
bankruptcy to exempt entireties property from estate); Ragsdale v. Genesco, 674 F.2d 277,
278 (4th Cir. 1982)(§ 522(b)(2)(B) of Code does not authorize debtors suffering a joint judgment
to exempt entireties property from estate); infra notes 56-82 (discussing judicial interpretations
of § 522(b)(2)(B)); infra notes 83-104 (discussing policy considerations concerning § 522(b)(2)(B)).
56. 674 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1982).
57. Id. at 278; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Although the Fourth
Circuit decided Ragsdale v. Genesco under Virginia common law and decided Sumy under
Maryland common law, both Virginia and Maryland common law are identical in all relevant
aspects concerning entireties property. See In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559, 565 (4th Cir. 1980)(discussing
Maryland law concerning tenancy by entirety); Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 737, 66
S.E.2d 599, 602-04 (1951)(discussing Virginia law concerning tenancy by entirety); supra note
8 (discussing common law principles of tenancy by the entirety).
58. Ragsdale v. Genesco, 674 F.2d 277, 278 (4th Cir. 1982). In Ragsdale the debtors
suffered a prebankruptcy judgment of $8,532.26, plus interest and attorney fees, on an
outstanding debt that the debtors owed the joint creditor. Id. The creditor recorded the
judgment and obtained a judicial lien on the debtors' entireties property, which had a value
of $74,500 and was subject to a first deed of trust in the amount of $51,482. Ragsdale v.
Genesco, 9 Bankr. 991, 992 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981).
59. Ragsdale v. Genesco, 9 Bankr. 991, 991 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); 11 U.S.C. §
522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing
debtor's authority to exempt interest in entireties property under § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code). The
debtors in Ragsdale claimed that § 522(f0l) of the Code authorized the debtors to avoid the
judicial lien that the creditor possessed onthe entireties property. Ragsdale, 9 Bankr. at 991;
see 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(debtor may avoid judicial lien on entireties
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recognized, however, that the language of section 522(b)(2)(B) authorizes
debtors to exempt interests in entireties property from the estate only to
the extent that the interests are not subject to creditor process under state
law. 60 The Ragsdale court then examined the applicable state law and found
that creditors holding a joint and several judgment against two persons may
execute in state court against the property that those same persons own as

joint tenants or tenants by the entirety. 61 The Ragsdale court found, therefore, that because the joint creditor in Ragsdale held a joint judgment
against the joint debtors that would permit the creditor to execute against

the debtors' entireties property in state court, the debtors could not exempt
their interest in the entireties property from the estate under section
522(b)(2)(B) of the Code. 62

property to extent that judicial lien impairs an exemption of a debtors' interest in entireties
property under § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code). Like the Fourth Circuit in Ragsdale, the bankruptcy
court in Ragsdale recognized that before § 522(f)(1) of the Code authorized a debtor to avoid
a judicial lien, § 522(b) of the Code must entitle the debtor to exempt the debtor's interest in
property from.the bankrupt estate. Ragsdale, 9 Bankr. at 932; see Ragsdale v. Genesco, 674
F.2d 277, 278 (4th Cir. 1982)(recognizing that § 522(b)(2)(B) must authorize debtor to exempt
interest in entireties property from estate before § 522(0(1) authorizes debtor to avoid judicial
lien). In considering whether § 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code allowed the debtors in Ragsdale to
exempt the equity interest in entireties property, the bankruptcy court examined Virginia law
and determined that Virginia law allows joint creditors to reach property that joint debtors
own as tenants by the entirety. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(debtor
may exempt interest in entireties property to extent that applicable nonbankruptcy law protects
interest from joint creditor execution). The bankruptcy court in Ragsdale held, therefore, that
§ 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code did not authorize the debtors to exempt their equity interest in
entireties property from the debtors' bankruptcy estate. Id. Thus, the bankruptcy court in
Ragsdale found that § 522(f)(1) of the Code did not authorize the debtors to avoid the judicial
lien on the debtors' entireties property. Id.
60. Ragsdale, 674 F.2d at 278-79; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
61. Ragsdale, 674 F.2d at 279; see Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 737, 66 S.E.2d
599, 603 (1951)(fundamental principle of debtor-creditor relations is that joint creditors may
obtain satisfaction of outstanding debts out of joint judgment debtors' entireties property).
62. Ragsdale, 674, F.2d at 279; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The
Fourth Circuit in Ragsdale failed to recognize, however, that because the debtors could not
exempt entireties property from the estate, the trustee could administer the entireties property
under section 363(h) of the Code. Ragsdale, 674 F.2d at 279. The Ragsdale court, therefore,
permitted the joint creditor to lift the automatic stay and proceed against the debtors' entireties
property in state court. Id.; accord Napotnik v. Equibank Parkvale Say. Assoc., 679 F.2d 316
(3d Cir. 1982). In Napotnik, as in Ragsdale, the creditor obtained a joint judgment against
joint debtors. Id. at 318. The creditor in Napotnik recorded the judgment and obtained a lien
against the debtors' entireties property. Id. The debtors filed a joint bankruptcy petition and
claimed that § 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code allowed the debtors to exempt their interest in entireties
property from the estate and, therefore, that § 522(f)(1) of the Code allowed the debtors to
avoid the judicial lien on the entireties property. Id. at 318. In considering whether §
522(b)(2)(B) of the Code authorized the debtors to exempt their interest in entireties property
from the estate, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that §
522(b)(2)(B) of the Code required the Napotnik court to examine state law to determine
whether the debtor's interest in entireties property was subject to levy and execution by joint
creditors. Id. at 319; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(debtors may exempt
interest in entireties property from estate only to extent that interest is not subject to process
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In ChippenhamHospital,Inc. v. Bondurant63 the Fourth Circuit extended

the scope of the Ragsdale court's holding concerning the ability of joint
creditors to execute against entireties property in state court.6 In Bondurant
the Fourth Circuit considered whether an unsecured joint creditor could
execute against the entireties property of an individual Title 11 debtor and
the debtor's nonfiling spouse to satisfy the creditor's joint claim against the

debtors.65 The debtor in Bondurant filed an individual petition for relief

under Chapter 7 of the Code.6 The debtor scheduled outstanding debts

that the debtor owed to the unsecured joint creditor.6 7 The unsecured joint
creditor petitioned the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay and allow
the creditor to proceed in state court to obtain and enforce a judgment
against the joint debtors.68 The debtor argued, however, that section
522(b)(2)(3) of the Code authorizes debtors to exempt from the estate
debtors' equity interest in entireties property and, therefore, exempt the

equity in the property from claims of joint creditors under sections 522(c)
and 522(f)(1) of the Code.6 9 In considering the arguments of the debtor and
creditor in Bondurant, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the language of

section 522(b)(2)(B) allows debtors to exempt interests in entireties property
from an estate only to the extent that creditors may not execute on the

interests in entireties property under state law. 70 The Bondurant court then

under applicable nonbankruptcy law). The Napotnik court then found that the applicable state
law permitted creditors to satisfy joint judgments from the entireties property of joint debtors.
Napotnik v. Equibank Parkvale Say. Assoc., 679 F.2d 316, 320 (3d Cir. 1982). The Napotnik
court held, therefore, that § 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code did not authorize the debtors to exempt
their interest in entireties property from the estate and that, consequently, the debtor could
not avoid the judicial lien under § 522(f)() of the Code. Id. at 321-22. See generally, Comment,
Section 522(b)(2)(B)-Debtor May Not Exempt PennsylvaniaEntiretiesProperty Subject to an
Existing Judgment Against Both Debtor and Spouse on a Joint Debt, 28 VLL. L. Rav. 655,
655-76 (1983)(discussing Napotnik holding).
63. 716 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1983).
64. Chippenham Hospital, Inc. v. Bondurant, 716 F.2d 1057, 1058 (4th Cir. 1983).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1057; see supra note 18 (discussing relief under Chapter 7 of Code).
67. Bondurant, 716 F.2d at 1057. The debtor in Bondurant listed an outstanding debt
of $1,346.60 that the debtor owed to the creditor for hospital care provided by the creditor.
Id. The creditor claimed that the debtor and the debtor's spouse were jointly and severally
liable for the outstanding debt. Id.
68. Id. The bankruptcy court in Bondurant granted the joint creditor's request to lift
the automatic stay, which would permit the creditor to proceed in state court and potentially
obtain a judgment against the joint debtors and to enforce the judgment against the entireties
property of the joint debtors. Id. at 1057-58. The district court in Bondurant affirmed the
bankruptcy court's holding to lift the automatic stay and allow the joint creditor to proceed
in state court to satisfy the outstanding debt. Id. at 1058; see supra note 42 (discussing
automatic stay).
69. Bondurant, 716 F.2d at 1058; 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(2)(B), 522(c), 522(f)(l) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
70. Bondurant, 716 F.2d at 1058-59; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III
1985)(debtors may exempt interest in entireties property from estate only to extent that interest
is exempt from creditor process under state law).
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examined the applicable state law and found that a joint creditor with an
unsecured claim against a debtor and the debtor's spouse may execute
against the debtor's entireties property in state court. 71 The Fourth Circuit
held that because applicable state law rendered the entireties property subject
to the claims of joint creditors in state court, section 522(b)(2)(B) of the
Code did not entitle the individual debtor to exempt from the estate the
debtor's interest in entireties property. 72 The Bondurant court recognized
that allowing debtors to exempt interests in entireties property from the
estate permits debtors to retract permanently the entireties property from
the reach of creditors.7 3 Because the the Fourth Circuit in Bondurant
permitted the creditor to lift the automatic stay to proceed in state court
instead of permitting the trustee to administer the entireties property under
section 363(h), however, the Bondurantcourt failed to address the potentially
inequitable treatment of similarly situated joint creditors that requiring the
creditors to race to the courthouse to obtain a priority lien may cause. 74
Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Bondurant, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Liberty State Bank & Trust v. Grosslight75
addressed the inequitable treatment of similarly situated joint creditors that
requiring creditors to proceed in state court against a Title 11 debtor's
entireties property may cause. 76 Upon the debtor's filing for relief under
the Code in Grosslight, an unsecured creditor of the debtor attempted to
levy and execute in state court on the entireties property of the debtor and
the debtor's nonfiling spouse to satisfy an outstanding joint obligation that
the debtor and his spouse owed to the creditor.7 7 The debtor claimed that

71. Bondurant, 716 F.2d at 1058. The Bondurant court found that Virginia common
law permitted an unsecured creditor to proceed against entireties property of an individual
debtor and the debtor's nonfiling spouse to prevent legal fraud. Id.; see supra note 49
(discussing legal fraud).
72. Bondurant, 716 F.2d at 1059; see Vasilon v. Vasilon 192 Va. 735, 737, 66 S.E.2d
559, 603 (1951)(Virginia common law permits creditors to proceed in state court to obtain
judgment against debtor and nonfiling spouse and enforce judgment against entireties property
of debtor and debtor's nonfiling spouse).
73. Id. The Bondurant court explained that § 522(f)(1) of the Code permits a debtor to
avoid a lien on property to the extent that the lien impairs an exemption that the debtor
claims under § 522(b) of the Code. Id.; 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b), (f)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
The Bondurant court further explained that under § 522(c) of the Code, property that a debtor
exempts under §§ 522(b) and (f) is not liable for the claims of creditors that arose before
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. Bondurant, 716 F.2d at 1059.
74. Bondurant, 716 F.2d at 1059; II U.S.C. § 363(h) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
75. 757 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1985).
76. Liberty State Bank and Trust v. Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir. 1985).
77. Id. Subsequent to filing for relief under the Code, the individual debtor in Grosslight
filed a schedule of exempted property that listed the debtor's entireties property as exempt
from the estate. Id. at 777. The creditor failed, however, to file an objection to the debtor's
claimed exemption of entireties property. Id. After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the creditor
in Grosslight instituted an adversary proceeding requesting that the bankruptcy court either
lift the automatic stay to permit the creditor to proceed in state court, or allow the trustee to
sell the debtor's entireties property under § 363(h) of the Code for the benefit of the creditor.
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section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code allowed the debtor to exempt his interest
in entireties property from the estate, and thus protect that interest pursuant
to sections 522(f)(1) and 522(c) from claims arising prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. 78 The Grosslight court found that the language of

section 522(b)(2)(B) prevented the debtor from exempting the debtor's
interest in entireties property from the estate because the applicable state

law permitted the joint creditor to obtain a joint judgment against the
debtor and the debtor's nonfiling spouse and enforce that judgment against
the joint debtors' entireties property. 79 The Grosslight court further found
that because section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code denied the exemption of the
debtor's interest in entireties property from the estate, the trustee could

administer the property under section 363(h) of the Code.80 Similar to the
Fourth Circuit in Sumy, the Sixth Circuit in Grosslight extended a joint
creditor's right to proceed against entireties property by permitting a trustee
to administer the entireties property under section 363(h) of the Code,
instead of requiring the creditor to proceed in state court to satisfy a
debtor's obligation.81 The Grosslight holding enhances judicial efficiency
and fairness by requiring only one judicial proceeding to administer joint
debtors' entireties property for the benefit of joint creditors instead of

requiring proceedings in both state court and bankruptcy court once a
debtor files a bankruptcy petition. 2
Id. In considering the creditor's request, the bankruptcy court in Grosslight found that by
failing to file an objection to the debtor's claimed exemption of entireties property, the creditor
did not follow proper bankruptcy procedure. Id.; see FED. R. BANKr. P. 4003(b) (creditor
may file objection to debtor's claimed exemptions). The bankruptcy court in Grosslight,
therefore, denied the creditor's request for relief and discharged the debtor from bankruptcy.
Grosslight, 757 F.2d at 777. On appeal the district court in Grosslight affirmed the bankruptcy
court's holding. Id. The creditor appealed the district court's holding to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 774. The Sixth Circuit found that the previous
adversary proceeding that the creditor initiated constituted an objection by the creditor to the
debtor's claimed exemption and considered whether § 522(b)(2)(B) authorized the debtor to
exempt entireties property from the estate. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
78. Grosslight, 757 F.2d at 774; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(c), (f)(1) (1982 & Supp. III
1985)(permitting debtor to avoid judicial lien).
79. Id. at 776; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(debtor may exempt
interest in entireties property from debtor's bankrupt estate only to extent that interest is not
subject to process under applicable nonbankruptcy law).
80. Grosslight, 757 F.2d at 777; 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(h), § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III
1985); see In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. 85, 90 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981X§ 363(h) of Code
authorizes trustee to sell entireties property in bankrupt estate for benefit of joint creditors of
individual debtor and debtor's nonfiling spouse); accord In re Koehler, 6 Bankr. 203, 209
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980)(§ 363(h) authorizes trustee to administer entireties property in bankrupt
estate).
81. Id.; see Sumy v. Schlossberg, 777 F.2d 921, 932 (4th Cir. 1985)(allowing creditor to
satisfy outstanding joint claim against debtor and debtor's nonfiling spouse through trustee's
sale of debtors' entireties property under § 363(h) of Code or through proceedings in state
court); 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(permitting trustee to sell debtors' entireties
property).
82. Grosslight, 757 F.2d at 777. The Grosslight court explained that because requiring
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In addition to judicial interpretations of section 522(b)(2)(B) of the
Code, policy considerations support the Fourth Circuit's holding in Sumy. 3
As a court of equity, a bankruptcy court should enforce the policies of the
Code, which are to provide debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate distressed
finances and to provide equitable treatment among the creditors of bankrupt
debtors. s 4 To facilitate the enforcement of the equitable policies of the
Code, Congress granted bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over the entire
bankruptcy proceeding.85 A bankruptcy court's jurisdiction includes the
jurisdiction to determine whether debtors may exempt property from the
6
estate and, therefore, from administration by the trustee.
In considering whether 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code allows debtors to exempt
interests in entireties property from an estate, a bankruptcy court must
ensure that debtors effectively do not withdraw entireties property from the
reach of joint creditors because equitable considerations entitle joint creditors the right to satisfy joint claims out of the entireties property held by
the joint debtors.8 7 For example, when a debtor effectively withdraws
entireties property from creditor process by exempting the property from
the estate under section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code, that property generally is
not subject to any debt that arose prior to the time the debtor filed the
bankruptcy petition. 8 Moreover, when a debtor obtains a discharge from
joint creditors to proceed in state court against a debtor and the debtor's nonfiling spouse
causes multiple judicial proceedings, permitting the trustee to administer the individual debtor's
entireties property for the joint creditors' benefit within the context of a single bankruptcy
proceeding enhances judicial efficiency. Id.; see supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing
trustee's power to sell entireties property under § 363(h) of Code).
83. Sumy v. Schlossberg, 777 F.2d 921, 929-32 (4th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 36-53
and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's holding in Sumy); supra notes 56-82
(discussing judicial interpretations of § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code); infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text (discussing policy considerations concerning § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code).
84. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(b), 1123(a), 1322(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(providing for
pro rata distribution of debtor's assets); Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765-66 (4th Cir.
1931)(bankruptcy court is court of equity that should enforce equitable policies of Code); In
re Trickett, 14 Bankr. 85, 89 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981)(bankruptcy court is court of equity);
supra note I (discussing Congressional goals of Code).
85. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)(c) (1984)(bankruptcy court has original jurisdiction over
civil proceedings arising or related to cases under Code); id. § 1471(e) (bankruptcy court has
exclusive jurisdiction over all debtor's property as of commencement of proceeding under
Code); see also 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 82-83 (discussing jurisdiction of
bankruptcy court).
86. See 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 82-83 (stating that bankruptcy court may
determine whether § 522(b) of Code authorizes debtor to exempt property from estate, or
whether debtor's property remains in estate); supra note 10 and accompanying text (trustee
may administer property in estate).
87. See Liberty State Bank & Trust v. Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 776 (6th Cir.
1985)(bankruptcy court must prevent injustices to creditors); Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d
764, 765-66 (4th Cir. 1931)(duty of bankruptcy court is to prevent legal fraud); supra note 49
(discussing legal fraud); supra note 1 (goal of Code is to provide equitable treatment to
bankrupt debtor's creditors).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B),(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 522(c) of the Code
provides that property exempted under § 522(b) generally is not liable to satisfy prebankruptcy
creditors' claims either during or after a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. § 522(c).
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bankruptcy, the debtor generally no longer personally is liable to creditors
for debts that the debtor incurred before commencement of the bankruptcy
proceeding.8 9 Finding that section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code entitles a debtor
to exempt entireties property from an estate, therefore, forces unsecured
joint creditors to act quickly to lift the automatic stay and proceed state
court to preserve the creditors' rights against a debtor's entireties property
before the bankruptcy court discharges the debtor from bankruptcy.9 When
unsecured joint creditors lift the automatic stay and proceed against entireties
property in state court, the first joint creditor to lift the automatic stay and
gain a judgment against the joint debtors receives a priority lien on the
entireties property under the laws of most states. 91 Forcing unsecured joint
creditors to proceed in state court to protect the joint creditors' rights
against a debtor's entireties property, therefore, creates a so-called "creditors
race" to the courthouse and violates the bankruptcy maxim that a bankruptcy court treat all creditors of the same class equally. 92 In addition to
creating a creditor's race to the courthouse, requiring joint creditors to
proceed in state court duplicates court and attorney expenses for joint

89. 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(2)(B) (1982); see 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(discussing
effect of discharge from bankruptcy). When a bankruptcy court discharges a debtor from
bankruptcy hnder §§ 727, 944, 1141 or 1328 of the Code, all judgments against the debtor
are void to the extent that the judgment determines the personal liability of the debtor. Id. §
524(a)(1). Additionally, when a bankruptcy court discharges a debtor under the Code, the
debtor is immune from all creditors attempting to attach personal liability to the debtor for
the discharged debt. Id. § 524(a)(2); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 944, 1141, 1328 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)(providing for discharge of debtor from bankruptcy under chapters 7, 9, 11 and 13
of Code, respectively).
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(all judgments against debtor are void
upon discharge to extent that judgment determines personal liability of debtor); Munoz v.
Dembs, 757 F.2d 777, 778 (6th Cir. 1985)(creditor cannot satisfy state court judgment against
debtor's property after debtor's discharge from bankruptcy); In re Palazzolo, 20 Bankr. 692,
693 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982)(creditors cannot execute against debtor's property to satisfy
prebankruptcy debts after court discharges the debtor from bankruptcy).
91. 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(b), 1123(a), 1322(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(specifying that
payments to creditors within same class be pro rata); see In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. 85, 90
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981)(forcing joint creditors to proceed in state court effectively creates
race to courthouse because first creditor to lift automatic stay and obtain judgment against
debtors receives priority lien); In re Anderson, 12 Bankr. 483, 490-91 (Bankr W.D. Mo.
1981)(bankruptcy courts should treat all similarly situated creditors equally).
92. See In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. 85, 90 (Bankr, W.D. Mich. 1981)(first creditor to lift
automatic stay receives priority lien); see also Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commission
on Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. Rav. 1, 123-26 (1975)(discussing
inequities in joint creditor bankruptcy procedure). Mr. Plumb explained that under the 1898
Act, on which the commission based the goals of the Code, bankruptcy courts had to allow
joint creditors to proceed in state court to execute against a joint debtors' entireties property.
Id. at 126. Mr. Plumb asserted that requiring joint creditors to proceed in state court, as
opposed to bankruptcy court, causes a race to the courthouse. Id. Unsecured Joint creditors
must race to the courthouse to obtain and record a judgment against joint debtors to receive
a priority lien over other joint creditors. Id. Inequities result, therefore, because the creditor
that "wins the race" receives distribution out of the debtors' estates before subordinate joint
creditors. Id.

1987]

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

creditors and may discourage joint creditors with insignificant claims from
proceeding in state court to satisfy the outstanding claims of joint debtors. 93
Disallowing the exemption of entireties property from the estate to the
extent that the property is subject to process under applicable nonbankruptcy

law, however, requires that all joint creditors proceed in bankruptcy court
to reach the entireties property of an individual debtor and the debtor's

nonfiling spouse. 94 Because federal bankruptcy courts treat unsecured joint

creditors equally, no unsecured joint creditor gains priority over another

regarding joint debtors' entireties property.95 Furthermore, disallowing the

exemption of entireties property under section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code
benefits a bankrupt debtor because a single judicial proceeding results in
less litigation, which quickens the judicial process and thereby allows the
debtor to rehabilitate his distressed finances at an earlier point in time. 96
By exempting entireties property from the bankruptcy estate, debtors

not only effectively may withhold entireties property from unsecured creditors, but also effectively may withdraw entireties property from the reach
of secured joint creditorsY7 Section 522(f)(1) of the Code allows debtors to
avoid certain types of liens, including prepetition judicial liens on property
that otherwise would be exempt under section 522(b) of the Code, to the
extent that the lien impairs the exemption. 9 Moreover, section 522(c) of
the Code provides that entireties property that is exempt under section

522(b) is not subject to debts that arose before the debtor filed a bankruptcy

93. See Liberty State Bank & Trust v. Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir. 1985)(multiple
judicial proceedings cause inefficient use of creditor resources).
94. See Liberty State Bank & Trust v. Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir.
1985)(disallowing exemption permits trustee to administer property under § 363(h) of Code
and thus unsecured and secured joint creditors must proceed in bankruptcy court); In re
Anderson, 12 Bankr. 483, 491 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)(disallowing exemption of entireties
property under § 522(b)(2)(B) necessitates that joint creditors proceed in bankruptcy to satisfy
claims).
95. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(b), 1123(a), 1322(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(providing for
equitable distribution of debtor assets); In re Anderson, 12 Bankr. 483, 490-91 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1981)(Code provides for equitable distribution of estate property). The Anderson court
recognized that a pro rate distribution of estate property under the Code was more equitable
than requiring each creditor to race to the courthouse to obtain a priority lien against a
debtor's entireties property. Anderson, 12 Bankr. 483, at 490-91; see also supra note 91
(discussing pro rata distribution of property of estate to creditors within same class).
96. See Liberty State Bank & Trust v. Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir. 1985)(denying
exemption of entireties property results in less litigation and, therefore, increases judicial
efficiency); Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Say. Assoc., 679 F.2d 316, 319 (3d Cir.
1982)(disallowing entireties property exemption § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code results in single judicial
proceeding).
97. See infra notes 102-108 (discussing how debtors may commit legal fraud against
secured joint creditors); supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing legal fraud).
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(debtor may avoid judicial lien on
property to extent that lien impairs debtor's claimed exemption under § 522(b) of Code); id.
§ 522(b)(2)(B)(permitting debtor to exempt interest in entireties property from estate to extent
that property is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law); supra note 47
(discussing § 522(0(1) of Code).
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petition.9 9 Therefore, to the extent that a court permits a debtor to exempt
the debtor's interest in encumbered entireties property from the estate, a
debtor in effect may shield forever the exempt entireties property from
those joint creditors who had previously secured a lien on such property.10
The Fourth Circuit's position in Sumy, however, prevents the apparent
inequitable treatment of secured joint creditors by refusing to allow Title
11 debtor's to exempt interests in entireties property to the extent that joint
creditors could execute against the property under nonbankruptcy law.' 0'
Because of the limited exemption that the Sumy court allowed under section
522(b)(2)(B) of the Code, a debtor may not avoid a lien on entireties
property under section 522(t(1) to the extent that the debtor's interest in
entireties property is subject to execution under applicable state law. 1°2
Rather, to the extent that a joint creditor has a claim against both a debtor
and the debtor's nonfiling spouse that the creditor may enforce by execution
on entireties property in state court, the property remains in the estate and
the trustee may administer the property for the benefit of the joint creditor. 103 Consequently, prohibiting a debtor from exempting entireties property
under section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code prevents joint debtors from effectively
withdrawing entireties property from the reach of joint creditors, and is
consistent with the equitable policies of bankruptcy which suggest that joint
creditors should obtain satisfaction of joint debts against a Title 11debtor
and the debtor's nonfiling spouse from entireties property. °4
In Sumy v. Schlossberg, the Fourth Circuit held that section 522(b)(2)(B)
of the Code did not permit an individual joint debtor to exempt entireties
05
property from an estate, and thus from administration under section 363(f).1

99. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(property of debtor that is exempt
under § 522(b) or lien on property that debtor may avoid under § 522(f) of Code generally is
not liable for creditors claims which arose before commencement of bankruptcy proceeding);
id. § 522(b)(2)(B) (allowing debtor to exempt interest in entireties property from estate to
extent that interest is not subject to execution under applicable nonbankruptcy law).
100. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (§ 522(c) & (f)(1) of Code permit
debtor effectively to withdraw entireties property from reach of joint creditors when debtor
exempts interest in entireties property from estate under 522(b)(2)(B) of Code).
101. U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text (discussing Sumy holding); supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (debtor
effectively may forever shield entireties property from reach of creditors through § 522(c) &
(f)(l) of Code).
102. See Sumy v. Schlossberg, 777 F.2d 921, 928 (4th Cir. 1985)(recognizing that under
§ 522(b)(2)(B) of Code debtor may exempt from estate only that interest in entireties property
which is not subject to creditor process under state law); 11 U.S.C. § 522(f0() (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)(debtor may avoid judicial lien on property to extent that lien impairs debtor's claimed
exemption under § 522(b) of Code).
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(debtor may exempt from estate
only that interest in entireties property which is not subject to creditor process under state
law); id. § 363(h) (trustee may administer entireties property for benefit of creditors); supra
note 44 and accompanies text (under Sumy holding, entireties property remains in estate).
104. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text ( Sumy holding prevents joint debtors
from withdrawing entireties property from reach of joint creditors).
105. See supra notes 18-53 and accompanying text (discussing Sumy holding).
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Judicial holdings and policy considerations demonstrate that the Sumy
court's refusal to exempt entireties property from the bankruptcy debtor's
estate under section 522(b)(2)(B) conforms to the equitable policies of the
Code.' 6 When courts refuse to follow Sumy's holding and permit an
individual joint debtor to exempt entireties property from the debtor's estate
in bankruptcy, joint creditors nonetheless can proceed in state court to
obtain a judgment against the individual joint debtor and the debtor's
nonfiling spouse.1 7 The joint judgment creditor then can satisfy the judgment out of the entireties property of the joint debtors. 0 Permitting
individual debtors to exempt property from the estate, therefore, potentially
causes multiple judicial proceedings between debtors and creditors, which
decreases judicial efficiency and increases the expenses of debtors, creditors,
and courts.' 9 The position that the Sumy court adopted, however, retains
in a bankruptcy estate the property that is subject to the claims of joint
creditors, thereby providing equal treatment to similarly situated creditors." 0
Therefore, the Sumy court's holding enhances judicial efficiency by providing for a single judicial proceeding, and thus facilitates a quick and efficient
financial rehabilitation of debtors."' Accordingly, the Sumy court's holding
provides the fairness and efficiency that Congress intended in enacting the
Code." 2 Courts at bar in states that allow joint creditors to levy and execute
against an individual joint debtor's interest in entireties property, therefore,
should adopt the Sumy position and refuse to allow individual joint debtors
to exempt entireties property from an estate under section 522(b)(2)(B) of
the Code.
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106. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982); see supra notes 56-82 and accompanying text
(discussing judicial interpretations of § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code); supra notes 83-104 and accompanying text (discussing policy considerations of disallowing exemption of entireties property
under § 522(b)(2)(B); supra note 1 (discussing equitable policies of Code).
107. See In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559, 573-75 (4th Cir. 1980)(when individual joint debtor
can exempt property from estate under § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code, joint creditor, nonetheless,
may execute against joint debtors' entireties property in state court); supra note 34 (discussing

Ford).
108. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (joint creditor possessing judgment
against joint debtors can satisfy judgment against joint debtors' entireties property under state
law).
109. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (allowing debtor to exempt interest in
entireties property under § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code forces multiple judicial proceedings, which
decreases judicial efficiency).
110. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (not allowing debtors to exempt interest
in entireties property under § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code provides equal treatment to similarly

situated joint creditors).
I 11. See supra note 1 (primary goal of Code is to rehabilitate debtor's distressed finances).
112. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (not allowing debtors to exempt interest
in entireties property under § 522(b)(2)(B) of Code promotes judicial efficiency).

